

MAPPING THE  
RWANDAN  
DIASPORA  
IN THE  
**UNITED  
KINGDOM**

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# MAPPING THE RWANDAN DIASPORA IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Conducted by







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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

<b>AFFORD</b>	African Foundation for Development
<b>DGD</b>	Diaspora General Directorate
<b>FGD</b>	Focus group discussion
<b>ICT</b>	Information, communications and technology
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>KII</b>	Key informant interview
<b>MINAFFET</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
<b>MTO</b>	Money transfer organization
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organization
<b>NHS</b>	National Health Service
<b>ONS</b>	Office for National Statistics
<b>RHC</b>	Rwandan High Commission
<b>RPF</b>	Rwandan Patriotic Front
<b>TVET</b>	Technical and vocational education and training



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While there is a growing body of research literature on Rwanda and its diaspora, there are no extant studies focusing specifically on Rwandans in the United Kingdom.

This is in large part attributable to the fact that the Rwandan community in the United Kingdom is a relatively small one, concentrated across three major urban areas: London, the Midlands and Manchester and the North, with smaller groups in Scotland and in the rest of England and Wales. It is difficult to accurately estimate the number of Rwandans in the United Kingdom, but an estimated figure of 10,000–15,000 is likely, drawing on existing data sources (see [section 2](#)). Rwandans in the United Kingdom mostly arrived between 1994 and 2000, with smaller numbers arriving in the period from 2000 to 2018.

Qualitative and quantitative data collected from over 180 Rwandans in the United Kingdom in July and August 2018, and subsequently in February–March 2019, show that they are economically active across a range of different sectors and well established in the United Kingdom.<sup>1</sup>

There were 176 surveys completed in online or paper format, 4 focus group discussions (FGDs) were held in different United Kingdom locations, and 22 key informant interviews (KIs) were completed face to face and by phone.<sup>2</sup> There was close consistency in data collected across the two phases.

The respondent cohort was a well-educated one, and the majority of respondents were career professionals, working across a range of roles in the private and public sectors, with some students also represented. Of the five TVET sectors of interest, 10 per cent of respondents were working in ICT, 6 per cent in hospitality and tourism, and 2 per cent for construction and renewable energy, with significant numbers of respondents also working in education, health and social care and management roles.

Rwandans in the United Kingdom contribute to Rwanda by deploying different forms of diaspora capital: financial, intellectual, human, sociopolitical and voluntarism. Rwandans in the United Kingdom remit significant amounts of money each month, although this amount is significantly lower among the younger cohort. Increasingly, they remit money using online platforms rather than traditional money transfer organizations.

<sup>1</sup> The survey was designed to be anonymous. All participants in semi-structured interviews and focus group discussion were encouraged to complete the online survey, but it is likely some did not do so.

<sup>2</sup> In the first phase, 125 surveys were completed and 4 FGDs and 1 semi-structured interview were conducted. In the second phase, 51 surveys were completed, and a further 7 semi-structured interviews were conducted.



However, it was identified that there is a need for future study of remittance flows to Rwanda from the United Kingdom.

A majority of respondents expressed an interest in working in Rwanda in ways that build on their existing patterns of engagement, and Rwandan professionals with skills in a range of sectors expressed their interest in taking part in skills transfer and volunteering initiatives.

A lack of effective information flow regarding community needs and opportunities to provide assistance were identified as the biggest barrier to enhancing contributions from Rwandans in the United Kingdom, suggesting a need for structured pathways for intervention that target Rwandans in the United Kingdom, in terms of enhancing their contributions to Rwanda.

The following recommendations are suggested to improve how Rwanda works with its diaspora in the United Kingdom, and enhance the contributions of Rwandans in the United Kingdom to Rwanda.

- (a) Improving information flow to harness human capital of Rwandans in the United Kingdom.
- (b) Harnessing voluntarism among Rwandans in the United Kingdom.
- (c) Mobilizing investments and remittances.
- (d) Connecting the Rwandan community in the United Kingdom to Rwanda.





# 1. INTRODUCTION

This research report describes the findings of a study on Rwandans in the United Kingdom, conducted by the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in the United Kingdom, as part of a four-country research project that examined Rwandan communities in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, managed by IOM Rwanda.

Data was collected in two phases: the first from May to September 2018, and the second from February to March 2019. Preliminary results from the first phase of data collection were presented to community members at two community sensitization meetings held in London and Coventry, organized by IOM and Rwandan High Commission (RHC) in January 2019. Feedback from these meetings were used to pilot the second data collection phase.

The primary aim of this research was to map Rwandan diaspora communities (henceforth referred to as “Rwandans abroad”) in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and their engagement with Rwanda, as well as the skills base of Rwandan professionals, in particular in relation to technical and vocational education and training (TVET) sectors, including information, communications and technology (ICT), construction, hospitality, mining and renewable energy.

Research objectives, as set out in the master methodology developed for the study, were to conduct a mapping exercise of the Rwandan community in the four countries in order to:

- (a) Estimate the number and composition of the diaspora in the area studied (profession, gender, age, skills, volume and location);
- (b) Outline the different levels of the diaspora’s awareness concerning the opportunities and facilities available in Rwanda;
- (c) Present a clear picture of the gaps in the diaspora’s awareness and knowledge concerning Rwanda’s socioeconomic situation;
- (d) Provide a list of expectations in terms of improved policy and other facilities that would help them participate in the country’s development;
- (e) Provide data on which field participants have been trained in, their interest in skills sharing in Rwanda; and
- (f) Identify the areas in which participants would like to contribute to Rwanda’s development and how this might be actualized.



Survey tools were structured around three main components:

- (a) Top-level, general demographic information about respondents (such as age, gender, residence in the United Kingdom and educational level);
- (b) Questions relating to employment and professional status, with reference to the specific TVET sectors of interest to the Government of Rwanda (ICT, construction, hospitality, mining and renewable energy); and
- (c) Questions relating to respondents' engagement with Rwanda, examining family perspectives, remittances, investment and business in Rwanda, broader contributions to development and barriers to further engagement.









## 2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, DEFINITIONS USED AND METHODOLOGY USED FOR THE STUDY

### 2.1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Following feedback from IOM Rwanda and the Government of Rwanda in particular, it was agreed that the objectives of the research were to map Rwandan diaspora communities in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, with particular focus on diaspora professionals and TVET sectors.

The purpose of this mapping exercise was to provide the Government of Rwanda with access to relevant information on the Rwandan diaspora in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, as well as identify members of the diaspora who would be interested in contributing their knowledge or continuing their contribution to the national development of Rwanda.

Research objectives, as set out in the master methodology developed for the study, were to conduct a mapping exercise of the Rwandan community in the four countries in order to:

- (a) Estimate the number and composition of the diaspora in the area studied (profession, gender, age, skills, volume and location);
- (b) Outline the different levels of the diaspora's awareness concerning the opportunities and facilities available in Rwanda;
- (c) Present a clear picture of the gaps in the diaspora's awareness and knowledge concerning Rwanda's socioeconomic situation;
- (d) Provide a list of expectations in terms of improved policy and other facilities that would help them participate in the country's development;
- (e) Provide data on which fields participants have been trained in, their interest in skills sharing in Rwanda; and
- (f) Identify the areas in which participants would like to contribute to Rwanda's development and how this might be actualized.



The Government of Rwanda stated a particular interest in certain TVET sectors, such as information technology (IT), construction, hospitality, mining and renewable energy. The country-level mapping exercises therefore focused on these sectors, while not excluding Rwandans abroad involved in other sectors. The Government of Rwanda requested that a focus on TVET be retained to ensure that the studies meet the needs of the Government more closely.

While the questionnaire contained sections that ask questions on employment professional and educational status, it was anticipated that these issues would more usefully be explored in greater detail using focus groups and semi-structured interviews of Rwandan professionals working in the above sectors.<sup>3</sup>

Research objectives thus included, and survey tools were structured around, three main components:

- (a) Top-level, general demographic information about respondents (such as age, gender, residence in the United Kingdom and educational level);
- (b) Questions relating to employment and professional status, with reference to the specific TVET sectors of interest to the Government of Rwanda (ICT, construction, hospitality, mining and renewable energy); and
- (c) Questions relating to respondents' engagement with Rwanda, examining family perspectives, remittances, investment and business in Rwanda, broader contributions to development and barriers to further engagement.

## 2.2. METHODOLOGY

### 2.2.1. Definitions used

Following discussion between the consultants with the Government of Rwanda and IOM Rwanda, it was agreed that the Government of Rwanda prefers the use of the term “Rwandans abroad” in place of “Rwandan diaspora”. It was also agreed that self-identification as “Rwandan abroad” be used as the principal definition of a Rwandan abroad, up to the third generation, that is, any person of Rwandan origin with a grandparent who was/is born in Rwanda and who identifies as Rwandan, and is involved in (or interested in) contributing to socioeconomic development in Rwanda.

De facto, most – if not all – respondents will meet this definition (origin and interest), as interest in completing such a questionnaire is strongly indicative that the respondent is Rwandan and interested in contributing to Rwanda's development.

<sup>3</sup> In keeping with good practice in social science research, research objectives and survey tools were developed that moved in theme from the general to the specific.



TVET is also defined in the broadest sense so as not to exclude potential diaspora professional respondents, while acknowledging specific TVET sectors of particular interest to Government of Rwanda, notably ICT, construction, hospitality, mining and renewable energy, as well as education and health.

### 2.2.2. Master methodology for the four country studies

A master methodology was developed and proposed by consultants working on the Belgium and Netherlands studies in advance of other country consultants coming on board, in part due to issues relating to contracting. The Government of Rwanda and IOM Rwanda were keen to develop a single methodology and survey tools to ensure comparability across the four country studies. At the same time, the Government of Rwanda and IOM Rwanda recognized the need for both flexibility at the national level in application of the master methodology and a minimum core data set to be established.

## 2.3. METHODOLOGY USED FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM STUDY

In executing this study, AFFORD employed both qualitative and quantitative research design to explore the diaspora constituents, in a manner that is consistent with the master methodology agreed for all four countries.

This mixed methodology approach took the form of semi-structured interviews and questionnaires used with selected individuals, networks, organizations and actors within the Rwandan diaspora in the United Kingdom.

A qualitative methodology was used due to its potential for generating in-depth knowledge on the context, content and ramifications of diaspora engagements. The major approaches used in data collection were therefore desk-based literature review, direct semi-structured interviews, written questionnaires and FGDs.

AFFORD used a combination of the following sampling methods to reach as wide a range of potential respondents as possible:

- (a) Random sampling: Selecting a random sample for mapping from the diaspora population (such as choosing 10 people to interview randomly at an event of 100 people). This was used at some community events to generate online survey responses and also some semi-structured interviews.
- (b) Snowball sampling (chain sampling): Research subjects recruit new subjects from their own acquaintances and friends – most prone to bias, but often most practical in this context. This method was used to identify most FGD and KII participants, in combination with purposive sampling below.



- (c) Purposive sampling: Selecting the sample on the basis of a particular criterion or characteristics, such as “Rwandan IT professionals in the United Kingdom”.

The online survey relied on a combination of random and snowball sampling, while FGDs and KIs relied on snowball and purposive sampling to identify suitable participants for both.

While quantitative data was gathered, analysed and interpreted to demonstrate the extent and magnitude of particular phenomena via questionnaires, these were supplemented and enriched by qualitative data gathered via FGDs and semi-structured one-to-one interviews. Given the small sample sizes inherent with mapping exercises of this type, especially given resource and time constraints, it is difficult to undertake meaningful quantitative and statistical analysis.

Different dimensions of diaspora capital (cultural, social, financial, intellectual and political) were explored by infusing these constituent elements as sub-themes in the questionnaires and other survey tools. Use of relevant links through known Rwandan diaspora networks, as well as the RHC, were used to access relevant policy and other documents of the Government of Rwanda.

Data collection was undertaken in two phases. An initial phase was conducted in summer of 2018, in which 125 surveys and 16 interviews were completed. Following the community feedback at these two meetings, and further feedback from IOM Rwanda and the Government of Rwanda, the research team undertook an additional data collection phase in February and March 2019, in which 51 surveys and 7 interviews were conducted.

### **Community sensitization and feedback meetings**

Preliminary results from this initial phase were presented to community members at two community sensitization meetings organized by IOM and RHC, the first one held in London on 10 January 2019, and the second in Coventry in the Midlands on 11 January 2019. In each of these meetings, IOM introduced the study and its aims and objectives, and the research team presented the preliminary findings of the first phase.

A question-and-answer session followed in each meeting, and community members were given the opportunity to ask questions or raise any points in relation to the findings presented. Community members were actively engaged and interested to hear the findings, and they raised a number of questions of the research team about the research, as well as the RHC/Government of Rwanda and IOM. These are reproduced in [Annex 4](#).



A significant proportion of the questions raised related to queries about the research findings and research methodology, and the research team answered these as far as possible. For example, community members queried the educational level of respondents and the relative representation of students in the sample.

There was interest in the chosen TVET sectors specified by the Government of Rwanda, and several respondents suggested health should also be included, especially given that there are a number of Rwandan health professionals working in the National Health Service (NHS). There was also interest from Rwandan students, recent graduates and young professionals in volunteering opportunities in Rwanda, something that RHC said it would be willing to provide more information to interested individuals.

Following the community feedback at these two meetings, and further feedback from IOM Rwanda and the Government of Rwanda, the research team undertook an additional data collection phase in February and March 2019, in which 51 surveys and 7 interviews were conducted.

For this second phase, many respondents are likely to have been, or were signposted to the survey by, participants in two community awareness-raising sessions that was organized by IOM.

Moreover, the research team made efforts to find respondents who were full-time professionals rather than students, to ensure that overrepresentation of this latter group was not distorting the findings.

The current report has been revised to address questions or points raised by community members in the two-sensitization meetings as far as possible.

For further information about the development of survey tools, as well as details of interview and FGD schedules, please see [Annex 1](#).

The full set of feedback and questions from community members in each meeting is reproduced in [Annex 4](#).



## 2.4. PRIVACY AND ETHICS

Researchers ensured that ethical principles, based on the IOM's Data Protection Principles, were respected throughout the duration of this exercise and that the respondents' privacy was protected.<sup>4</sup> Participation was on a voluntary basis, and informed consent was maintained throughout the exercise.

Respondents were informed that the purpose of the exercise was to gauge diaspora interest in contributing to Rwanda's development, and that participants' personal information would remain anonymous and would not be required to participate in the survey. Confidentiality was further maintained during the FGDs and KIs, including obscuring the precise locations of these at participants' request.

One concern that was raised early on by community members at a large community event held in Coventry on 7 July 2018 was about how any data provided to the study would be used, especially in terms of personal data being shared with third parties, in particular commercial companies.<sup>5</sup> To mitigate these concerns, data protection/privacy statements were strengthened and included on all research tools used.

Privacy and confidentiality were obviously a concern to many participants. FGD and interview participants expressed a preference that details of their engagement with the research team be anonymized and locations disguised. Around half of the interview and FGD participants also requested that voice recordings not be used as these could be attributable, so detailed notes were taken by the research team instead.

## 2.5. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

This mapping exercise sought to capture the views of a relatively small-sized sample of the Rwandan diaspora living abroad in the United Kingdom. Although significant efforts were made to reach the widest audience possible, certain limitations affected the overall results of the exercise.

One of the main challenges encountered in conducting this study was recruiting respondents, which took significantly more time and resources than was anticipated. There was a marked reluctance from some community members to participate in the research. The research team encountered mistrust from potential and actual respondents during the course of the study about its true purpose. Most (over 80%) of the FGD and interview respondents could be characterized as broadly supportive of the Government of Rwanda's policies, although questions were not posed about

<sup>4</sup> Further details about IOM's data protection principles are available at [http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iomdataprotection\\_web.pdf](http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iomdataprotection_web.pdf).

<sup>5</sup> Interestingly, this corresponded with popular media concerns about the use of personal social media data by commercial third parties.



politics in the United Kingdom or in Rwanda as this was beyond the scope of this research.

Online surveys and questionnaires come with their own limitations by design: not all respondents will answer all questions, nor will necessarily do so consistently, especially when asked a series of questions on a particular topic.

Potential reasons cited by interview and FGD participants for the challenges in engaging respondents included, inter alia:

- (a) Mistrust about the real objectives of the study (some saw it as an exercise by the Government of Rwanda and Government of United Kingdom to collect personal data);
- (b) Perceptions of AFFORD as a being non-Rwandan organization;
- (c) Perceptions of AFFORD as being too close to the Government of Rwanda/ RHC;
- (d) Mistrust of Government of Rwanda (whether for personal or political reasons);
- (e) Mistrust of the Government of United Kingdom due to concerns over current migration policy approaches; and
- (f) In the first data collection phase, timing of the study as many Rwandans travel back home in the summer.

Minor limitations included survey fatigue and a lack of faith in the successful implementation of the project's findings and/or development of programmes by the Government of Rwanda targeting Rwandans in the United Kingdom.<sup>6</sup>

Contingency planning to overcome these challenges included renewed efforts at activating and dialoguing with a variety of Rwandan community actors, both on a referral basis through existing contacts and partnerships, and also through "blind" approaches. As more "passive" approaches to generating data proved to be unsuccessful, the research team found it necessary to adopt a very "active" approach to engaging potential respondents. These included the following:

- (a) The online survey was made available through several different channels – via email to those who participated in events (both those that formed part of the project and other AFFORD events);
- (b) Via social media channels (including those of RHC and IOM United Kingdom);

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<sup>6</sup> *Survey fatigue* is a common phenomenon in social science research whereby respondents are less likely to respond to a survey as they are tired or bored of undertaking research surveys previously, or with the non-application of results from a research survey.



- (c) Through monthly, and then weekly email reminders to relevant contacts held by AFFORD; and
- (d) Weekly or more frequent phone calls to chase up potential respondents.

It should be noted that levels of community engagement were variable, even after the two community sensitization meetings, and the research team had to maintain a proactive approach to generating respondents.

Other contingency planning activities included confirmation from IOM of the researchers' position and trustworthiness, and frequent contact with potential participants in order to demonstrate the research team's commitment to the project.

Broadly speaking, the research team found it more fruitful to use informal approaches to groups of individuals, rather than working formally with Rwandan diaspora community organizations in the United Kingdom to organize FGDs and interviews. This reflects the generally limited organizational capacity of United Kingdom-based Rwandan diaspora organizations, many (if not most) of which are not formally registered and are run by community members on a voluntary basis.









## 3. DESK/LITERATURE REVIEW

While there is a growing research literature on the Rwandan diaspora community residing abroad, to date, no studies have focused on the Rwandan diaspora community residing in the United Kingdom. In part, this can be linked to the small size of the group (see population section below), which makes it hard for central and local authorities to justify conducting national- or local-level studies in the way that has commonly been done for larger communities in the United Kingdom. Secondary data sources consulted for this review also include official data from the Government of United Kingdom (Office for National Statistics (ONS), also the UK Home Office and NHS), Government of Rwanda official policy documents and online searches of relevant websites and social media channels used by Rwandans in the United Kingdom.

### 3.1. DEFINING THE RWANDAN DIASPORA COMMUNITY ABROAD AND FRAMING RWANDAN IDENTITY

There is a sizeable body of literature on how diaspora communities may be defined, and indeed about the desirability or usefulness of the term “diaspora”, which is contested by some groups. In some European countries, there is considerable conflation of the terms “diaspora” and “migrant”, although in the United Kingdom context, such conflation is arguably less common, in part because of the presence of large, well-established and well-integrated diaspora communities who have been there for three or more generations.

Definitions of diaspora also differ as to whether the term includes the following: (a) first-generation migrants only; (b) second-generation migrants; (c) third-generation migrants (that is, where a grandparent is/was a migrant from a given country); and/or (d) subsequent generations and the “worldwide historical African diaspora”. Most African States – and Rwanda is no exception to this based on earlier versions of its diaspora policy<sup>7</sup> – tend to place a cut-off at the third generation, (that is, where one or both grandparents are from a country of origin). This is informed by practical as well as theoretical considerations.

Rwandan identity is also strongly articulated, at home and abroad, in part through its diaspora. As Simon Turner notes in his article titled “Staging the Rwandan diaspora: The politics of performance”:

<sup>7</sup> The most recent version publicly available dates from 2009.



Staging the diaspora as progressive and as contributing to national unity becomes part of a larger nation- building project that is about “staging” or “performing” Rwanda as a show-case of national unity. The audience here is not only the diaspora, but also Rwandans inside Rwanda as well as the international community.<sup>8</sup>

Indeed, elsewhere the same author refers to Rwanda as a “diasporic State”, due to the role of its diasporas in its complex and sometimes troubled history in the twentieth century.

More significantly for current purposes, the Rwandan diaspora community residing in the United Kingdom may be broadly categorized into three categories: (a) those who are pro-government; (b) those who oppose the current government; and (c) those who are ambivalent or indifferent. These distinctions are articulated and recognized by Rwandans themselves, both by Rwandans abroad, and indeed in Rwanda itself. Indeed, the Government of Rwanda itself implicitly refers to these three groups, for example on the use of the term “negative diaspora” (that is, those who work to undermine Rwanda and its development) in several public speeches by officials of the Government of Rwanda over the last 10 years.<sup>9</sup>

### 3.2. MIGRATION HISTORY OF RWANDAN DIASPORA COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Migration from Rwanda over the last 100 years can be divided into different phases. In common with most African States, most Rwandan migrants and diaspora have historically moved to, and indeed continue to move to other African States, often those bordering on Rwanda. The largest Rwandan communities are therefore to be found in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania; there are also smaller communities in Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa, for example.

During the colonial period, there was limited migration to Belgium and to a lesser extent France, both for work opportunities (generally low-skilled) and educational opportunities, a process that continues to the present day across a number of European States (inter alia, Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).

One legacy of the colonial period was to reify ethnic differences and divide Rwandans accordingly, combined with policies encouraging labour migration to the Congo; this led to waves of outward migration to countries in the region. The 1994 genocide led

<sup>8</sup> Turner, 2013.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.; cf. also Shindo, 2012 and Jones, 2015.



to the largest wave of migration, as several million Rwandans fled to neighbouring countries and beyond. Subsequent migration outflows may be linked to those critical of the current government in Kigali, and those seeking business, employment or educational opportunities abroad or fleeing poverty or natural disasters.

Rwandan diaspora communities are therefore diverse and heterogeneous, and include many people of mixed Hutu and Tutsi ancestry. The horrifying events in Rwanda in 1994, their trajectories and aftermaths, fall outside the scope of this study. For this reason – as well as the practical consideration that many Rwandans abroad may have chosen to be ambiguous about their own ethnic origin – the present study is not concerned with the ethnic origins of Rwandans in the United Kingdom.

Migration of Rwandans to the United Kingdom can thus be classified into three phases: (a) pre-1994; (b) 1994–2000; and (c) 2000–present. The pre-1994 group are likely to be very small – those few Rwandans who came to the United Kingdom for study or employment (the largest number of this group are likely to be found in Belgium and France for historical and linguistic reasons). The largest group in the United Kingdom is likely to be the 1994–2000 category, followed by the 2000–present category. This is supported by the fact that over 83.33 per cent of Rwandans officially residing in the United Kingdom were born in Rwanda, although only 17.66 per cent of the sample reported being Rwandan citizens, that is, passport holders.

### 3.3. POPULATION ESTIMATES AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTIONS FOR RWANDANS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Accurately assessing the size of Rwandan communities in the United Kingdom is challenging for a number of reasons. Firstly, official data is collected across three defined areas across the countries of United Kingdom – England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland – which independently collect their own data (albeit in a harmonized way) through national censuses that are conducted every 10 years. The most recent national censuses were in 2016. The data from the national censuses are supplemented by annual labour surveys and other data sources. Much of these census data that relate to foreign nationals and people born outside of the United Kingdom are aggregated into regional output areas, such as East Africa.

Secondly, the mobility of the diaspora itself tends to militate against accurate measurement. Leaving aside the Government of United Kingdom's policy of not collecting data on people leaving the United Kingdom, especially citizens from other European Union States, Rwandans abroad (and especially those with European citizenship) can and do move freely both across Europe, as well as between Europe, the United States of America and Canada.



Thirdly, United Kingdom data collection is largely on an official basis. This means that such data will necessarily exclude those individuals residing in the country unofficially: (a) those whose migration status may be irregular; (b) those who have successfully obscured their origins, for example by assuming the nationality of other States; and (c) those who have reason not to be officially counted.

These three factors combined mean that official figures will tend to underreport a given diaspora community, sometimes by as much as a factor of two or three.

According to the National Census conducted by ONS in 2016, there are approximately 1,000 Rwandan nationals living in the United Kingdom, and a further 5,000 adult individuals who were born in Rwanda. As noted above, individuals' nationality can change, so aside from Rwandan nationals registered in the United Kingdom, the best proxy indicator for Rwandans abroad is those whose country of birth is registered as Rwanda. These figures also support the idea that most Rwandans in the United Kingdom came post-1994, with the majority arriving in the 1994–2000 period.

The ONS data and confidence intervals therein express this as a range of between 3,000 and 9,000 people, with a total median figure from these two groups of approximately 6,000 individuals.

ONS data also gives an indication of the geographic distribution of Rwandans in the United Kingdom, drawing on census data. Predictably perhaps, these indicate that the largest community hubs are found in London, with approximately 2,000 people, followed by Manchester (1,000 people), the Midlands (1,000 people) and Scotland (1,000 people). Smaller numbers are distributed in the south-east of England and other regions of the United Kingdom.

However, these data do not necessarily include family members, especially children born in the United Kingdom to parents who were born in Rwanda, and who in many cases may hold United Kingdom or other European Union citizenship status. This is also significant because African communities in the United Kingdom tend, on average, to have more children than the broader British population. While data are collected on the children of mothers born in Rwanda, this does not seem to extend to fathers. ONS data indicates that between 2012 and 2016, 329 babies were born to mothers whose country of birth was Rwanda (that is, no longer Rwandan nationals). If this is doubled to account for males whose country of birth was Rwanda fathering children (a conservative estimate), this means that the total United Kingdom figure is increased by a further 650+ people.

Local authority data has been searched extensively as part of this study, but with little result; as noted earlier, the small size of the Rwandan community in the United Kingdom means that it is difficult for local authorities to conduct local-level studies on these. Similarly, NHS staff data can be a useful source of secondary data on diaspora



communities, by virtue of the fact that the NHS workforce is so diverse. Perhaps contrary to expectation, the number of people from Rwanda (Rwandan nationals and those born in Rwanda) working in the NHS in England and Wales in 2017 was very small, at only 50 people across all clinical roles.<sup>10</sup>

As the above discussion shows, the official figure of approximately 6,000 community members of “Rwandans abroad” is likely to be a significant underestimate of their actual numbers in the United Kingdom. A review of all available data sources therefore suggests a total likely figure of between 10,000 and 15,000 people.

### 3.4. GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA'S INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT

The Government of Rwanda itself actively recognizes and promotes the role of Rwandans abroad in contributing to Rwanda's development, peace and growing prosperity. This is evidenced through numerous Government of Rwanda policy and planning documents, as well as speeches and other announcements.

The Rwandan diaspora are referred to as the sixth region of Rwanda, directly mirroring African Union policy, and Government of Rwanda recognizes dual nationality, which is controversial in some African States.

#### 3.4.1. Vision 2020

Rwanda's long-term development goals are defined in Vision 2020, a strategy that seeks to transform the country from a low-income, agriculture-based economy to a knowledge-based, service-oriented economy with middle-income country status by 2020. The diaspora is explicitly referenced in this vision for the future:

Rwanda will become a modern, united and prosperous nation founded on the positive values of its culture. The nation will be open to the world, including its own Diaspora. Rwandans will be a people, sharing the same vision for the future and ready to contribute to social cohesion, equity and equality of opportunity.<sup>11</sup>

[Annex 2](#) of the Vision 2020 report explains how the colonial regime created “waves of emigrants running away from the colonial yoke and ruthless rule”, how the state in the period from independence to 1994 played a negative role vis-à-vis the diaspora, and how the post-genocide state has ensured dual citizenship, efforts towards good relations and contact and a “participatory approach and generalized consultation”.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Baker, 2019.

<sup>11</sup> Rwanda, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2000:12.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.



There is, therefore, a perception that there has been a drastic shift from pre- to post-genocide State-diaspora relations, and that this is due to the progressive stance of the post-genocide Government of Rwanda.

### 3.4.2. Diaspora General Directorate

In 2001, a desk in charge of the diaspora was created in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MINAFFET) to help the Rwandan diaspora to acquire services they need from their motherland; and in 2008, the Diaspora Desk was formalized into the Diaspora General Directorate (DGD).

The Government of Rwanda recognizes that Rwandans abroad are potentially able to contribute to the homeland in three ways: (a) as agents of economic development; (b) as goodwill ambassadors; and (c) as a resource of knowledge and skills. First and foremost, this entails a “constructive relationship with their motherland” or as stated in the vision of the DGD, “(a) United Rwandan Diaspora dedicated to and integrated in, the national development of their Motherland”.<sup>13</sup> It states that the mission of the Government of Rwanda in relation to diaspora engagement is to mobilize Rwandan diaspora communities for unity and cohesion among themselves targeted for the promotion of security, image building and socioeconomic development of Rwanda.<sup>14</sup>

### 3.4.3. Rwandan “community abroad” policy

The Government of Rwanda has published a number of diaspora engagement policies, the latest of which that is publicly available dates from 2009. It is understood that the Government of Rwanda is in the process of updating their diaspora engagement policy. The policy sets out three guiding pillars, each with their own specific objectives, which are listed below:

- (a) Cohesion of the Rwandan diaspora;
- (b) Rwandans in the diaspora are equipped with accurate information about their nation; and
- (c) The Rwandan diaspora plays significant role in the socioeconomic development of Rwanda.

These three guiding pillars provide an interesting assessment of the Government of Rwanda’s policy priorities, as well as the role it envisages for the diaspora.

In the first of these, for understandable historical reasons, the focus is on promoting cohesion within Rwandan communities abroad and also a recognition of the role played by the diaspora as informal ambassadors for Rwanda. The second pillar emphasizes the

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Rwanda, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 2009:2.





need for sharing accurate information to the diaspora and, by implication, combating disinformation. The third pillar sets out the strategic objectives for the Government of Rwanda's diaspora engagement in terms of mobilizing different forms of diaspora capital for Rwanda's development.

A summary of the Government of Rwanda's programmes set out in the policy to deliver these objectives is included in [Annex 5](#).





## 4. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS: DEMOGRAPHICS, EDUCATION AND SKILLS

A total of 176 questionnaires were collected during the data collection phase of this study, of which 121 were completed online and 55 were completed in paper format.

As is common with this type of survey, not all respondents answered all questions. For questions where the number of respondents is less than 176, the number of responses received is given, along with a footnote to all graphs identifying the number of non-responses to each question. Quantitative findings from questionnaires were analysed using SPSS and Microsoft Excel to generate reliable results.

The two data sets were cleaned, merged and reviewed by an external data expert before analysis of the new, larger data set by the research team. The larger data set was found to be largely consistent with the findings of the first data collection phase, typically with a variance of a few per cent on each question, which was expected from the relatively small overall sample size. The data sets from each research phase were analysed to assess any differences between them, but no significant differences were found between the two.

In total, 31 respondents (16 males and 15 females) participated in 4 FGDs held in the north of England, the Midlands, the South-East (including London) and the South Coast. A total of 22 respondents (11 males and 11 females) participated in semi-structured interviews held in different locations in the United Kingdom or by telephone.

FGDs and semi-structured interview questions were structured to mirror that used in the questionnaires, in order to encourage greater consistency between responses across groups or individuals. However, the research team also sought to allow respondents to lead the direction of the discussion if they so wished. This was important to give respondents the space and time to talk about the issues that mattered to them.

FGDs and semi-structured interviews were conducted almost exclusively in English, although there was one focus group and two interviews that were conducted in a mixture of French and English, either because they were more comfortable expressing themselves in French (in the case of older interviewees aged over 40), or because the discussion between participants alternated between English and French.



Of the FGDs, one was composed exclusively of male professionals aged 31–60, one was mostly Rwandan women aged 31–45, one was a mixed group of male and female professionals aged between 18 and 45, while the last FGD was comprised of a cohort of mixed professionals and students aged 18–30. One limitation thus identified in the qualitative research was a failure to survey older community members, particularly relevant given the commonly stated desire of many Rwandans residing in the United Kingdom to ultimately retire in Rwanda.

Data from FGDs and semi-structured interviews were analysed thematically, identifying keywords, phrases and concepts that were raised by respondents.

## 4.1. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

### 4.1.1. Gender

Of the online survey sample, 55 per cent were male, while 45 per cent were female. While every effort was made to ensure a balanced sample in terms of respondent gender, sampling methods used mean there was a tendency for more male respondents to take part. Of the FGDs and semi-structured interview respondent data sets, 50 per cent were male and 50 per cent were female.

### 4.1.2. Age

The majority of respondents (43%) were aged 31–45, with the 18–30 age group following closely behind (38%). Of the respondents, 18 per cent fell into the 45–60 category. This could be as a result of survey uptake methods, habits and distribution (online versus paper-based questionnaires), a hypothesis supported by the lack of any respondents over 60 years of age.

### 4.1.3. Marital and family status

Most respondents were married (46%) or single (43%). Of the respondents who answered this question, 32 per cent stated they were parents (41 out of 108 respondents, although as a percentage of the total sample size, this equals only 35%). On average, parents had three to four children (compared to a national United Kingdom average of 1.79).




In terms of family status of the interview and FGD respondents, most (62%) of the younger cohort of respondents were single or married, with a maximum of four children. By contrast, in the 31–45 age groups and above, the majority (63%) were married (or divorced) and had two to three children. This was consistent with data gathered from the questionnaires and literature review, which suggested that Rwandans on average have more children than their British counterparts, a pattern that is quite typical for diaspora communities in the United Kingdom.

#### 4.1.4. Geographical distribution in the United Kingdom

Regarding respondents' geographical distribution in the United Kingdom, the majority were residents in London (25%), with significant clusters in Birmingham (12%), Manchester (11%), Reading (8%) and Coventry (8%) that correspond to known community centres in the United Kingdom (Figure 1). Respondents were overwhelmingly based in England, with only 3 per cent living in Wales, 3 per cent in Scotland and 1 per cent in Northern Ireland.

**Figure 1. Geographical distribution of respondents**




Notes: Number of respondents: 168  
Non-respondents: 10



### 4.1.5. Nationality and residence

Respondents were asked a series of questions about where they were born, where else they had lived other than the United Kingdom and what their nationality (citizenship) was.


**Figure 2. Birthplace of respondents**



Notes: Number of respondents: 168  
Non-respondents: 10

Figure 2 shows that the majority of respondents (71%) were born in Rwanda. The next most common countries of birth were the United Kingdom (9%) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (7%), followed by Belgium and Burundi at approximately 4 per cent each. This also suggests that Rwandan identity is not solely linked to country of birth, but rather is a transnational identity based on family and cultural ties.

Of the respondents, 52 per cent stated they had lived in other countries in addition to the United Kingdom or Rwanda. Of these, the most common countries stated were Belgium (33%), United Republic of Tanzania (12%), France (12%), Kenya (11%), Germany (10%), Uganda (8%), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (8%), the Netherlands (8%), South Africa (5%) and the United States (5%). Therefore, the overall data is indicative of the considerable mobility of the Rwandan diaspora, both within the European Union, between African States and further afield.

**Figure 3. Nationality of respondents**

Notes: Number of respondents: 168

Non-respondents: 10

The majority of respondents (61%) were British citizens, with the next most common nationality being Rwandan (39%) (Figure 3). This also includes dual passport holders, who made up 26 per cent of survey respondents. However, it is not clear how many of these hold dual British and Rwandan nationality, or dual citizenship with another country (such as Belgium), reflecting survey and reporting limitations.


Significant minorities held other European Union citizenship, reflecting the Europe-wide mobility of the African diaspora in general, and Rwandan cultural and historical ties in particular. Most respondents arrived in the United Kingdom in the last 20 years (59%), within the last 10 years (32%) or were born in the United Kingdom (9%). However, of those aged 18–30, 22 per cent were born in the United Kingdom.



#### 4.1.6. Language use

One marker of Rwandan identity was language use. The primary languages spoken by Rwandans in the United Kingdom are English, Kinyarwanda and French. Other languages spoken include Kiswahili, Lingala, Dutch, German and Kirundi. With the younger 18–30 age bracket, just under half (42%) did not speak Kinyarwanda, an issue raised by respondents in FGDs and interviews, although the question did not specify respondents' level of fluency in any language.

**Figure 4. Language used by respondents**



Notes: Number of respondents: 168

Non-respondents: 10

Most FGD and interview respondents spoke English, Kinyarwanda and some French (Figure 4). However, younger respondents aged 18–30 were less likely to speak Kinyarwanda. Several FGD and KII respondents in the 18–30 category noted that they were lacking in confidence in their ability to speak and write Kinyarwanda proficiently, and noted that their poor “accent” when speaking it was noticed by other Rwandans.

Conversely, older respondents reported that they had lived in more than one African country (typically, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Uganda or United Republic of Tanzania, and also Egypt, South Africa and Sudan), and thus were more likely to speak other languages, such as Kiswahili and Lingala (commonly mentioned), as well as Kirundi and Arabic.

A particular concern raised by older participants was that the younger generation was less likely to speak or learn to speak Kinyarwanda, and that their connection with their Rwandan culture, identity and motherland was being lost. Over half of the older respondents suggested there was a need for Kinyarwanda classes for young Rwandans in the United Kingdom, either delivered by Rwandan diaspora organizations or by RHC.






## 4.2. EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND SKILLS

There is very little data available on the economic and employment status of Rwandans in the United Kingdom. Anecdotal evidence, supported by information from Rwandan informal community and professional networks, suggests Rwandans are active across different sectors and professions, with a range of levels of experience and seniority. Rwandans in the United Kingdom are employed in business, retail, finance, IT, education and government. Rwandans also have a reputation for entrepreneurial flair, and many have set up their own businesses. As noted above, far fewer than expected work in the health sector based on NHS data (only 50 people across all clinical roles), although this will not include those employed in non-clinical, social care or private health-care fields.

One important aim of the present study was therefore to collect more detailed data on the economic and employment status of Rwandans in the United Kingdom. Data collected suggests that the Rwandan community in the United Kingdom is well-educated, in employment and committed to taking advantage of study or training opportunities.

**Figure 5. Educational attainment of respondents**



Notes: Number of respondents: 160  
Non-respondents: 18  
GCSE – General Certificate of Secondary Education  
BTEC – Business and Technology Education Council



The respondent cohort was a well-educated one, with nearly half of the respondents educated to degree level, and 30 per cent possessing a postgraduate qualification or research degree (compared to around 35% in the broader United Kingdom population who are educated to undergraduate level) (Figure 5).<sup>15</sup>

This is likely to reflect both sampling bias and the high premium placed on education by the Rwandan community in the United Kingdom; nearly 20 per cent of respondents said they were currently studying (in addition to working). Age and gender were also factors in this regard: in the 31–45 categories, 35 per cent of women were educated to degree level or above; while in the 18–30 category, this rose to 59 per cent.

In terms of the different subjects or disciplines studied by respondents, Figure 6 shows these at degree level or postgraduate level:<sup>16</sup>


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<sup>15</sup> ONS, 2011.

<sup>16</sup> This was an open-entry question, and respondents included a range of qualifications at A-level/BTEC and also GCSE; these have been excluded from the chart.



Figure 6. Subjects and/or disciplines studied by respondents



Notes: Number of respondents: 90  
Non-respondents: 88



Equally, over 50 per cent of respondents in interviews who came to the United Kingdom as young adults reported that their motivation for coming initially was learning, professional development and self-advancement, and there is clearly a high premium placed on intellectual capital within the Rwandan community in the United Kingdom. Some younger respondents made reference to this tendency, which they saw as creating a burden of expectation on them and as a source of pride. Several respondents cited the Kinyarwanda concept of Imihigo in this regard, which literally means “vowing to deliver” but carries also connotations of “competing to succeed” (these terms are explained in further detail in [Annex 6](#)).


#### 4.2.1. Employment

Most respondents were employed, with a significant minority (15%) being undergraduate or postgraduate students.

Of those employed, there was a wide variety of occupations, with approximately 20 per cent working in public, voluntary or private sector management, and a further 10 per cent working in health or social care fields.

No questions were asked about respondents’ incomes, but occupation can be seen as a loose proxy indicator of this. Typically, in the United Kingdom, those in management roles will earn between GBP 30,000 and GBP 60,000 per annum, while those in the health and social care fields will typically earn less, between GBP 20,000 and GBP 35,000 per annum.

**Figure 7. Employment status of respondents**




Notes: Number of respondents: 160  
Non-respondents: 18



The second largest subgroup (11% of respondents) stated their occupation as “full-time students” – slightly lower than those who reported that their employment status was “student” (15%) (Figure 7). However, these categories are not discrete, and respondents were able to select more than one option. Moreover, all those who stated they were a student were also in full or part-time employment.

**Figure 8. Occupation of respondents**



Notes: Number of respondents: 148

Non-respondents: 28


Most (83%) of the FGD and interview participants were educated professionals, with established careers or postgraduate or undergraduate students with ambitious career plans. As with questionnaire distribution, this could reflect an inherent sample bias through the types of community groups and networks that the research team engaged in the study, and also the focus on TVET.

Of those employed, there was a wide variety of occupations, with approximately 20 per cent working in public, voluntary or private sector management, and a further 16 per cent working in health or social care fields (Figure 8).

Just under half of all survey respondents were relatively experienced workers, with over 10 years professional experience in their chosen field. Nearly half of the respondents had 5 years of professional experience or less, reflecting the relatively high proportion of younger respondents at an earlier point in their careers.



**Figure 9. Professional experience of respondents**



Notes: Number of respondents: 160

Non-respondents: 18

FGD and interview participants were largely educated professionals, with most of them having 6 to 10 years of professional experience, excluding students (Figure 9). Of the 31–45 years or older cohorts among FGD and interview respondents, most had worked in Rwanda, but this was much earlier in their careers, and most had since retrained to different professions in the United Kingdom, European Union or the United States. The FGD and interview summary tables in Appendices 2 and 3 provide some information about participants' professional background/ occupation.

Finally, survey respondents were asked if they had ever worked in Rwanda, and only 28 per cent of survey respondents had ever worked in the country previously. There was an even distribution of genders for those who had worked in Rwanda previously, while only 3 respondents in the 18–30 age cohort had done so. Of those who had stated that their occupation in Rwanda had changed, 10 per cent had worked for a family business, 8 per cent had worked in retail, and 7 per cent had worked as either civil servants or teachers. No other previous occupations in Rwanda were stated by respondents.


This suggests that initiatives seeking to foster diaspora return (short- or long-term) should consider targeting Rwandans in the United Kingdom who have never worked in Rwanda. While it is likely that those with experience of working in Rwanda would be more likely to have better understanding of local needs and contexts pertaining in the country, and feel a closer connection to it, there is clearly a larger pool of Rwandans in the United Kingdom who have grown up outside the country. Any promotions or other campaigns to encourage productive return of Rwandans abroad should therefore be differentiated to target these two groups.



### 4.3. TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Respondents were asked what TVET they had completed. Survey respondents reported completing vocational or technical training in the following areas:

**Figure 10. Technical/Vocational education and training of respondents**



Notes: Number of respondents: 156  
Non-respondents: 22


The professional category with the highest number of respondents who had completed TVET was IT at 13 per cent, followed by finance/financial technology (fintech) (12%), teaching (11% if primary and secondary teaching are combined) and hospitality and tourism (6%).<sup>17</sup> Only 3 per cent of survey respondents had experience of construction or renewable energy, while no respondents cited training in mining (Figure 10).

The largest category – “Other (please specify)” – is broken down into sectors on Figure 11, according to respondents’ description of their areas of expertise.

<sup>17</sup> The relatively high percentage of respondents who cited finance/fintech professional training may represent a limitation of survey design, as the category is relatively broad and was loosely defined.



Figure 11. Respondents' areas of expertise in technical/vocational education and training



Notes: Number of respondents: 70  
 Non-respondents: 108





Although the numbers of survey respondents who had received training in the five specific sectors of interest to the Government of Rwanda (construction, ICT, renewable energy, mining and hospitality) are relatively small in absolute terms, it can be expected that it is representative of the broader Rwandan community in the United Kingdom.

Similarly, when asked about whether they were aware of Rwandan professionals in specific TVET sectors of interest to the Government of Rwanda (in particular, construction, ICT, renewable energy, mining and hospitality, as well as others, such as health, education and finance/fintech), most FGD and interview respondents thought they knew of a few (ranging from one or two to a handful) in their personal networks, with the exception of the mining sector. No FGD or interview respondents knew of any Rwandans with training or experience of mining, although a few had engineering experience in other fields.

On the question of returning to Rwanda to take up professional or job opportunities, almost all FGD and interview respondents (92%) expressed some interest – if the role and, in particular, the terms and conditions were beneficial to them. Many expressed commitment to the idea of returning to Rwanda to contribute their professional skills, but this was also moderated by the realities of supporting families and mortgages in the United Kingdom, and the difficulties in making as much money in their chosen field in Rwanda as they do in the United Kingdom. As a result, their interest in taking up professional opportunities in Rwanda was restrained by the need to cover costs of family in the United Kingdom, and so any employment opportunities taken up in Rwanda would need to offer commensurate benefits (either financially or in terms of quality of life, in the short or medium term) in comparison with employment opportunities in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.

Of the younger 18–30 cohort, almost all expressed an interest in taking up job opportunities in Rwanda to gain professional experience and “give back” to the country. At the same time, they expressed concerns about the financial viability of such a move, and also not knowing where they could find out about such opportunities. For younger respondents in the 18–30 age group, most had not (yet) sought to find career or investment opportunities in Rwanda, but many said that they knew of someone (such as an extended family member or a friend of a friend) who had done so. This suggests that relocation to Rwanda for professional reasons is an aspiration for this age group, rather than a reality for many.

Over 60 per cent of interview and FGD respondents were aware that the Government of Rwanda was looking to recruit Rwandan professionals from the diaspora to fill roles in certain sectors. When asked how they were aware of this or what sources of information they used, answers included “statements from the Government of Rwanda” (42% of FGD/KII respondents). It is unclear whether this referred to content on the RHC website, other Government of Rwanda websites or other sources, such as speeches by politicians or officials, and “word of mouth” (37% of respondents). No



respondent reported they had seen jobs advertised on the RHC website or other Government of Rwanda websites.

There was a consensus among all respondents in interviews and FGDs that lack of accurate, trusted information was one of the main barriers to taking up professional opportunities in Rwanda. Several suggested there should be some sort of platform, community forum, website or service that provided accurate information about such opportunities to Rwandans in the United Kingdom, either run by the RHC in the United Kingdom or independently. A community leader consulted as part of the research suggested there was a need for a job brokerage service targeting Rwandan professionals.

While over half of the FGD and interview respondents were aware that the Government of Rwanda was seeking to attract Rwandans abroad with specific skills and experiences, there was, in general, very poor awareness of the specific TVET sectors that the Government of Rwanda wishes to focus on – only three respondents reported being familiar with these. This suggests a need for better promotion or communication of these TVET sectors.

Indeed, a few expressed the view that their skills and experience had a commercial value, and that Government of Rwanda should be willing to pay for this, rather than working with the research team “to find out candidates for free”. Such attitudes should perhaps be understood within the context of African governments, including the Government of Rwanda, seeking to harness different forms of capital (especially financial) from their respective diasporas, an approach that may be perceived as exploitative or extractive.

Equally, FGD and interview respondents were divided over the desirability of programmes being delivered by the Government of Rwanda or through other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Rwanda. Some felt that officially sanctioned schemes had greater credibility, while others expressed frustration at the necessity of obtaining approval from MINAFFET. One suggestion made by a few respondents was that it would be useful if local communities could put up requests for support or help on an online platform, and then interested Rwandans abroad could match their skills and availability with these. Several respondents expressed the need for greater flexibility in how they are able to contribute their time, money and skills.



#### 4.4. ORGANIZATION OF THE RWANDAN COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: SOCIAL, PROFESSIONAL AND FAITH NETWORKS

The Rwandan community in the United Kingdom, as in other European States, is diverse and resists easy compartmentalization or stratification. As with other diaspora communities, they tend to organize themselves socially through family, kin or hometown connections. Rwandan culture itself promotes tight organization and ethical obligations to mutual help, both locally and to extended family or broader home country.

However, classification is complicated by the division into those who are more supportive of the Government of Rwanda, those who are more critical of the Government and those who are ambivalent. In the former case, local Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) chapters and the RPF youth wing are very active in organizing and mobilizing community resources for the benefit of Rwanda.

As an example of the Rwandan community's ability to mobilize resources, the research team have seen Rwandan community members at an event in 2013 organized in partnership with the RHC in the United Kingdom competing with each other to pledge money for the Agaciro investment fund, raising approximately GBP 50,000 in one evening. These groups maintain regularly updated and well-run social media groups and other communications channels.

As with many transnational communities worldwide, use of social media and messaging apps is widespread, with numerous private groups on Facebook, WhatsApp and Messenger. Many FGD and KII informants referred to using such groups/networks, and accessing and sharing information on Rwanda via such media; and the Government of Rwanda and RHC already make use of these to share information. Partly due to divisions within the community, social media groups used by community members tend to be closed and difficult for outsiders to access.

A related factor here is the relative importance in political or other resource terms of Rwandans in the United Kingdom and other European Union States to Rwanda. While total numbers in each country are small in relation to the size of Rwandan communities in say, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo or United Republic of Tanzania, the Rwandan community in Europe have a degree of prestige arising from their (perceived or actual) social, intellectual and political capital, as well as financial resources.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Cf., *inter alia*, Rwanda, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2000; Rwanda, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 2009; Turner, 2013; Shindo, 2012; and Jones, 2015.



Most survey respondents (89%) reported that they belong to a church or faith network. A large proportion (60%) belong to Rwandan community organizations in the United Kingdom. As noted elsewhere, these are generally small community organizations that are run entirely on a voluntary basis; indeed, many (if not most) are not formally registered in the United Kingdom as charities or social enterprises. Similarly, most (if not all) do not appear to be registered in Rwanda.

Although these have limited capacity, they form an important community meeting point, as well as provide some signposting and referral services for community members in need. The RHC and RPF United Kingdom membership also works closely with Rwandan community organizations to organize community activities, in particular for young people, as well as to consult the community on political matters. Only one Brighton-based organization surveyed, RYiCO, had an active website and was registered as a charity in the United Kingdom; they are working to deliver projects in the United Kingdom and Rwanda, where they support victims of domestic violence and provide access to vocational skills for women.<sup>19</sup> In the case of this organization, it was in the process of changing its business model from that of a voluntary sector organization or NGO to a social enterprise due to the time-consuming and technocratic nature of applying for mainstream grants, and the perception that African diaspora organizations were at a disadvantage compared with larger NGOs.

A similar proportion of survey respondents (64%) stated that they belonged to student or alumni networks, although it is not clear to what extent respondents were referring to mainstream or community-specific networks. Such groups that exist appear to be private and informal in nature. Most of the networks of this type identified by respondents were linked to United Kingdom universities, but others will no doubt exist in other European countries and in Rwanda itself.

Participants in FGDs and interviews were also asked if they were aware of, or belonged to, any networks of Rwandan professionals or student and alumni associations. While some respondents said they belonged to or knew of some networks of Rwandan professionals, these were not formal and were generally small, private groups of friends and colleagues. If they belonged to any such networks, these were not specific to Rwandans in the United Kingdom.

Similarly, there appear not to be any formal Rwanda-specific student and alumni networks for Rwandan students in the United Kingdom; rather, these are run on an informal basis and closed to outsiders. The lack of such networks specific to Rwandan professionals and students in the United Kingdom arguably suggests there may be value in the Government of Rwanda supporting the establishment of these in the future.

<sup>19</sup> For more information, please see <https://ryico.org/>.








## 5. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS: RELATIONSHIP WITH RWANDA, VOLUNTARISM AND RETURN

### 5.1. TRAVEL TO RWANDA

As previously noted, the Rwandan community in the United Kingdom are proud of their Rwandan identity and heritage, and keen to maintain and deepen their relationship with the country. This relationship is enacted in various ways, including different contributions they make while they are in Rwanda.

**Figure 12. Respondents' frequency of travel to Rwanda**




Notes: Number of respondents: 151  
Non-respondents: 27

Most respondents in the 31–45 and 46–60 cohorts travelled to Rwanda either very year or every few years. For the younger cohort of 18–30 years, the percentage of those who travelled yearly dropped to 14 per cent, with a majority of 48 per cent travelling back every two to three years (Figure 12).

When asked the reasons for their travel, the vast majority of survey respondents (95%) cited “family”, with the next most common reasons reported as “tourism” (9%) and “business” (9%). No respondents who selected “Other” provided details of the reason for their travel (Figure 13).



**Figure 13. Respondents' reasons for travelling to Rwanda**



Notes: Number of respondents: 152  
Non-respondents: 26


Similarly, when asked about their family links to Rwanda, 73 per cent of survey respondents cited “direct family” and 26 per cent cited “wider family”.

Reasons cited for returning in FGDs and interviews were usually multiple, combining visiting family and some voluntary activities (usually, but not exclusively for family and/or local community), as well as perhaps some business activities. Only one respondent said they travelled to Rwanda several times a year for work.

One barrier to returning was the cost of travel; as one father of three noted, “Sometimes a ticket is GBP 800, so I’m starting to go back less and less, as that’s money I’d rather send to them as remittances.”

Almost all respondents stayed for between two weeks and one month, largely dictated by leave periods and school holidays (Figure 14). Returnees usually travelled with money and goods to take back to family or donate to the local community. The most common goods to take back included clothes, electrical equipment, computers and educational materials. A few respondents who raised this stressed their commitment to doing so to help kith and kin, and also noted that this created additional financial pressures.



**Figure 14. Respondents' duration of stay in Rwanda**

Notes: Number of respondents: 152


Non-respondents: 26

## 5.2. CONTRIBUTIONS IN RWANDA

Survey respondents reported participating in – or contributing to – Rwanda in a number of different ways when they were in the country. The vast majority made financial contributions to family or local community initiatives (88%) during their stay, followed by volunteering their time (78%), faith group activities (63%) and also political activism (20%) (Figure 15). Volunteering efforts were focused on initiatives working for the benefit of extended family networks and/or the local community. In FGDs and interviews, some respondents reported they took part in family or local community initiatives and cited examples, such as building or repairing a house, digging a community well or taking part in communal agricultural activities, such as clearing fields or helping with harvests.



**Figure 15. Respondents’ contributions while in Rwanda**



Notes: Number of respondents: 160  
Non-respondents:16

Respondents were also asked if they ever sent or took back goods or materials during their stay in Rwanda. Survey respondents reported that the most common goods were clothes (13%), books (11%), electrical or IT equipment (9%), medical supplies (6%) and cars (3%). Several FGD and interview participants also reported sending or taking back items, in particular clothes, books and IT equipment, such as laptops, tablets or smartphones.

Given the short duration of the average stay in Rwanda, over half of the FGD and interview respondents expressed frustration that there were not more opportunities to volunteer their time, especially at the local level, on a short-term basis. It was suggested that there be some form of online platform where MINAFFET or local communities could advertise local needs and volunteering opportunities, and Rwandan diaspora could advertise their areas of expertise to match these.

“

*We living abroad have all been trained, and we all have something to give to Rwanda, but there is no platform for matching needs with skills/capacities. We all want to bring back what we have to our country and culture.*

”

Male professional, 31–45 years old



Others suggested that previous schemes, such as a Government of Rwanda-sponsored “volunteer office” in Rwanda, *Kwigira* projects (local community volunteering projects; *Kwigira* means “self-reliance” in Kinyarwanda) or the *Ingobyi* (local community ambulance scheme), were good practices from the country that could be extended or targeted specifically at Rwandans abroad.

One barrier raised to increased diaspora voluntarism was the perception by some respondents that all activities had to be coordinated via MINAFFET, when it would be more attractive to potential diaspora volunteers if placements could be organized directly with local communities.

Conversely, others also proposed that a national diaspora volunteering service should be established to coordinate

both long- and short- term volunteering placements for Rwandans abroad, especially for young people. This could also provide an important pathway for young diaspora professionals and students to gain experience and share skills and knowledge, as well as build their connection with Rwanda.

This theme was raised by several younger respondents in the interviews and FGDs, as well as at community awareness-raising meetings organized as part of the research, who expressed a strong interest in volunteering and working in Rwanda to gain experience, but were unsure of what opportunities existed, how to find out about them and how to make best use of these.

While some suggested there was a need for incentives, such as diaspora ID card scheme, tax relief or access to credit, others felt that they did not want any special treatment as Rwandans abroad.

Significantly, only 20 per cent of survey respondents expressed an interest in seeing more scope for political involvement by Rwandans abroad in Rwanda, and only 10 per cent who expressed interest in having diaspora Members of Parliament in Rwanda to represent the interests of Rwandans abroad. Although it is difficult to evaluate what appetite exists among different African diaspora communities in the United Kingdom for greater political involvement or diaspora representation, this was lower than anticipated by the research team, based on their experience of working with other diasporas. This is likely to be reflective, in part at least, of prevailing public-political discourses on diaspora political involvement in Rwanda itself, as opposed to other States in Africa where there is clearly greater public interest in this.

“

*I'm a second-generation Rwandan abroad and I've just graduated from a university in the United Kingdom. I would very much like to volunteer in Rwanda to gain experience and help people back home, but how can I do this? I don't know where to look...*

”

Female recent graduate, 18–30 years old




### 5.3. REMITTANCES TO RWANDA FROM RWANDANS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Formal remittance flows to Rwanda form an important source of foreign currency transfers to the country, making up approximately 2.4 per cent of GDP in 2018 at USD 181 million.<sup>20</sup> This is significantly lower than some other African States, and can mean that Rwanda is less reliant on remittances and less affected by fluctuations in remittances flows. Remittances can also be viewed as a loose proxy indicator for economic activity of Rwandans in the United Kingdom. Given that informal remittance flows to Africa are typically estimated by the World Bank to be worth at least 50 per cent of formal remittances, it is likely that the total amount being remitted to Rwanda each year is over USD 250 million.

Figure 16 sets out the total amount remitted to Rwanda over the last five years based on World Bank data.<sup>21</sup> Unfortunately, to date, it has not been possible to obtain figures from the National Bank of Rwanda to compare these figures with and identify any potential disparities. However, the general trend shows that remittance flows to Rwanda have slowly increased since 2010, with slight dips in 2013 and 2016. While there is no clear data explaining the reasons for these dips, it is likely that they stem from worsening economic or labour market conditions in countries of residence of the Rwandan diaspora.

**Figure 16. Total remittance flows to Rwanda, 2010–2017 (in USD)**



Source: World Bank, n.d.a.

<sup>20</sup> World Bank, n.d.a.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.



As seen on Table 1, important remittance-sending countries can be found across North America and Western Europe (particularly Canada, France and Belgium). However, the most important sending countries are within Africa – Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Burundi.

There appears to be a curious absence of available data relating to remittances flows from the United Kingdom to Rwanda, which do not feature on ranking lists of remittances to Rwanda by source country published by the World Bank, the Pew Research Center or others.<sup>22</sup> By way of comparison, in 2017, France was the fifth highest source of remittances to Rwanda at USD 7 million, according to World Bank data.

Close examination of the World Bank Bilateral Remittances Matrix confirms that no data are held on remittances to Rwanda from the United Kingdom. However, an article published in 2017 by Access to Finance Rwanda states that 9.7 billion Rwandan francs (approximately GBP 8.2 million or USD 10.7 million) are remitted from the United Kingdom each year, and remarkably even notes that this was remitted by 4,781 Rwandans in the United Kingdom; this would make the United Kingdom the sixth highest source of remittances to Rwanda.<sup>23</sup> The data source for this claim is not clear.

The top 10 ranking source countries of these remittances to Rwanda in 2017 are set out in Table 1.

**Table 1. Remittance inflows to Rwanda by source country in USD million for 2016**

Ranking	Country	Amount remitted to Rwanda in 2017 in USD
1	Democratic Republic of the Congo	59 000 000
2	Uganda	32 000 000
3	Burundi	26 000 000
4	United Republic of Tanzania	12 000 000
5	Republic of the Congo	11 000 000
6	France	7 000 000
7	Belgium	5 000 000
8	Canada	5 000 000
9	South Africa	3 000 000
10	Zambia	3 000 000

Source: World Bank Data Bank, n.d.b.

<sup>22</sup> See, for example, data and charts available at <https://databank.worldbank.org/data/home> and [www.pewglobal.org/interactives/remittance-flows-by-country/](http://www.pewglobal.org/interactives/remittance-flows-by-country/).

<sup>23</sup> See [www.afr.rw/resources/news/article/rwanda-receives-9-7-billion-rwandan-francs-from-diaspora-in-uk-annually](http://www.afr.rw/resources/news/article/rwanda-receives-9-7-billion-rwandan-francs-from-diaspora-in-uk-annually).




Also, as Roxana Torre showed in a visualization of remittance flows in 2014, Rwanda is both a destination country (USD 179 million) and a source country (USD 196) for remittances (see [Annex 7](#)).

However, these remittances still only account for a minority of the remittance transfers into the country, especially when factoring in informal remittances, the bulk of the remainder enters the economy through unofficial remittance agents operating on behalf of merchants in the country.

The majority of the survey respondents (nearly 60%) regularly sent remittances to Rwanda, although this dropped to 42 per cent in the 18–30 years of age category, reflecting a pattern common across diaspora communities where remittance flows drop off in the second and subsequent generations.


**Figure 17. Monthly average of money transferred by respondents**



Notes: Number of respondents: 157

Non-respondents: 21

The highest percentage of respondents (29%) said that they sent back at least GBP 101–GBP 150 per month on average, followed by 22 per cent who said they sent back less than GBP 50 (Figure 17). However, when broken down by age cohort, there is a clear tendency for the average amount remitted each month to increase with age.

**Figure 18. Average monthly remittances to Rwanda by age group**

Notes: Number of respondents: 97  
Non-respondents: 79

Respondents cited a range of different means used to send money back to Rwanda, the most common of which were money transfer organizations (MTOs) (42%) and online transfer platforms (40%), although in the 18–30 age category, use of online platforms was higher (at just over 50%). Significant numbers of respondents also used direct bank-to-bank transfers (in particular via Barclays) (22%) or sending money with people returning back to Rwanda (26%) (Figure 19).

As with the questionnaire responses, the majority of FGD and interview participants remitted money to Rwanda – the main differences being in amount, frequency and transfer methods used. The younger 18–30 years cohort were less likely to send remittances other than occasionally, or in response to family emergencies, while older age groups were more likely to remit more money monthly or even more frequently. There was a clear pattern of remittance levels dropping off with each younger generation of Rwandans in the United Kingdom, as their connection with the country is more distant. In the words of one young female respondent, expressed with a certain wistful regret, “I don’t send money home; my mum does.”

“  
*When I look at my phone to see my transfers (to Rwanda), I am shocked to see how much I have spent in the last 10 months.*

”  
Rwandan male professional, 30–45 years old


Typical amounts remitted varied from respondent to respondent, but ranged between less than GBP 50 per month on average and several hundred pounds. A few respondents said their remittance payments were cyclical, typically every three months, in order to meet the needs of school fees or when a family member fell sick.



A diverse range of mechanisms were used to send money back to Rwanda. Many of the older respondents preferred to use more traditional MTOs such as Western Union, or sending money via friends or families to take into the country. Others still said they used direct bank-to-bank transfers in Rwanda, in particular via Barclays Bank, which has an agreement with the Government of Rwanda to this effect.

Anecdotal evidence further suggests that some make use of third parties, such as businesspersons who will transfer funds to neighbouring African States and then arrange for cash to be brought in to the country. By contrast, a number of online remittance platforms have arisen in recent years, such as WorldRemit and Muhecash (set up by a Rwandan entrepreneur in the diaspora), offering better transaction and currency exchange rates, as well as convenience, as transfers can be made via an Internet-connected smartphone. Multiple respondents in KIIs and FGDs reported people carrying cash with them when travelling to Rwanda, both for themselves/their own families and for others. This is consistent with informal remittance patterns across Africa.

**Figure 19. Ways of sending money to Rwanda**



Notes: Number of respondents: 154  
Non-respondents: 24

Rwandans in the United Kingdom may be mistrustful of using formal channels for money transfer, and as can be seen on Figure 19, significant numbers still prefer to remit through informal or semi-formal channels, for example through prominent businesspeople in the diaspora, to neighbouring countries, from where money is taken across the border into the country. Reasons for such behaviour cited by FGD and interview respondents included the following: (a) mistrust of formal channels or






institutions; (b) mistrust of electronic banking; and (c) having greater trust in informal channels (whether cash taken by friends or semi-formal transfer routes).

Interestingly, several FGD and interview respondents noted that remittances were “a form of private consumption” and therefore not sufficiently socialized, as well as a source of dependency or reliance. This echoes both official Government of Rwanda policy discourse, which aims to reduce the country’s reliance on remittance flows, as well as debates among academics and policymakers about improving the social or developmental impact of remittances.

When asked what the money would be used for, by far the most popular reason cited by survey respondents was “family” (98%), followed by education costs (74%), health costs (70%) and buying land or property (39%). A further 20 per cent said it was used for investing in business (Figure 20).

**Figure 20. Reasons for sending money to Rwanda**



Notes: Number of respondents: 150  
Non-respondents: 28

Respondents in FGDs and interviews, who reported that the primary reason for sending money was largely for family support, but also specifically education and health costs, and investing in business (usually small-scale family businesses), mirrored this. In the latter case, respondents who had done so said their aim was to generate an income for family members and themselves. As one male respondent stated, “I wouldn’t even characterize it as investing in Rwanda. It’s more like when we need help from each other, we provide it. Sometimes I send money there; sometimes they send money to me when I need it.”




### 5.4. INVESTMENTS IN RWANDA

Rwandans in the United Kingdom are also involved in investment and business across different sectors, both within the United Kingdom and within Rwanda. There is anecdotal evidence of Rwandans in the United Kingdom investing in the housing, IT and agricultural sectors; however, given the limited data available, one aim of the study was to gather more qualitative data on the investment and business activities of Rwandans in the United Kingdom.

While most survey respondents had not already invested in business opportunities in Rwanda (66%), a significant proportion (one third) had done so. Of those who had, most had invested in land (38%) or property (30%) or family business (22%).

In terms of FGD and interview respondents' experiences of investing in Rwanda, around half of the older 31–45 and 46–60 cohorts had invested in some form of business in the country. In most cases, this was restricted to small-scale family businesses, for example retail or catering, but some had invested money in IT (Internet cafes), import–export or the stock market. Land and property were again the most common types of investment for most respondents, with land being used for agricultural purposes (33% of respondents) or building on (40% of respondents). Most property investments were for use by family members or as a second home/retirement home for investors.

**Figure 21. Respondents' experiences in investing in Rwanda (in %)**



Notes: Number of respondents: 52  
Non-respondents: 124



Awareness of investment opportunities and products aimed at the Rwandans in the United Kingdom was mixed. Of the survey respondents, 45 per cent said they were “not at all informed” about potential investment opportunities targeting Rwandans abroad; 46 per cent said they were “somewhat informed”, while only 12 per cent described themselves as “well informed” and 2 per cent as “very well informed”.

This was echoed in the FGDs, although additionally 37 per cent of FGD and interview participants were aware of, and many older Rwandans had invested in, the Government of Rwanda’s Agaciro Sovereign Wealth Fund, although several of those who had done so noted this was not primarily aimed at the diaspora.

The younger 18–30 group typically had not invested in the country but are interested to do so in the future and wanted to learn more about opportunities, including the diaspora bond. They considered access to timely and relevant information the most important in this regard, and some suggested the need for multiple entry levels for potential investors and segmented marketing to facilitate this.

“

*Investing in Rwanda is a great idea, but we’ve all got an uncle somewhere with some crazy get-rich-quick scheme. How can we know what’s best to invest in?*

”

Rwandan female professional, 18–30 years old

A number of barriers to investing in Rwanda was cited by 149 survey respondents. Foremost of these was a lack of relevant information (29%), closely followed by access to capital (19%). Other barriers stated were time (17%), risk (9%) and access to credit (5%). However, it is likely that had this been an open-entry question (that is, without prompting), different responses may have been given.

Interview and FGD respondents were also asked what they considered the barriers were to investing in such opportunities in Rwanda. The most common barriers or challenges cited were a lack of accurate lack of information about what opportunities exist, lack of investment capital and lack of access to credit. Several also mentioned investment risk as a barrier, and asked how the Government of Rwanda and other stakeholders could mitigate this.

When asked what would encourage them to invest in Rwanda, 65 per cent of survey respondents cited “accurate information”, while 13 per cent cited “clarity on tax implications”, and 10 per cent mentioned the need for better targeted and structured investment products, including access to mortgage credit.



Some respondents who had lived in East Africa also cited the *Harambee* mutual savings scheme operating in Kenya, and felt this could be a model that Rwanda could adopt as another means of mobilizing diaspora financial resources at a local level.


Over half of the female participants in FGDs and semi-structured interviews stated they had invested money in business in Rwanda, although typically this was in a “family business”, which upon further probing ranged from a family shop or small and medium enterprise, to a restaurant, catering or hotel business. Other businesses invested in included import–export, IT and clothing.

Motives for women investing included providing for their families in Rwanda (that is, generating an income and/or jobs for family members), as well as additional income for the business owners in the United Kingdom, and also as a retirement plan.

Certainly, many respondents aged over 30 years expressed an aspiration to retire to Rwanda. This was complicated though by the social pressure to return after building a successful career, and more practical considerations such as family in the United Kingdom, finances (such as pensions and mortgages) and health. This was a common enough tendency to be the butt of jokes among participants, who acknowledged that this would be a dream for many. The Government of Rwanda should therefore consider developing initiatives, and in particular investment opportunities, targeting this section of the Rwandan community.

## 5.5. DIASPORA BOND TARGETING RWANDAN COMMUNITY ABROAD

Respondents were also asked if they would be interested in investing in a Rwandan diaspora bond piloted by the Central Bank of Rwanda, and if so, how much they would consider investing. Of the survey respondents, 71 per cent stated that they would be interested in investing in such a bond. When asked how much they would be willing to invest, 14 per cent stated they would be interested in investing GBP 500, a further 6 per cent said they would be interested in investing GBP 1,000–GBP 2,000, and 3 per cent are interested in investing more than GBP 2,000.

**Figure 22. Interest in investing in a Rwanda diaspora bond**

Notes: Number of respondents: 103  
Non-respondents: 73

These patterns were born out in FGDs and semi-structured interviews, with 65 per cent expressing interest in such a diaspora bond, although there was also a degree of scepticism about such schemes. In particular, interviewees who were interested said they would need to know much more about the details of the scheme, in particular (upfront and hidden) costs, length of investments, benefits and risk profiles before committing.

This suggests that any diaspora bond that is launched should be structured to allow multiple entry levels and also lengths of investment period.

## 5.6. ENGAGEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA'S POLICIES AND INITIATIVES

Survey respondents were asked where they found out about relevant Government of Rwanda policies and initiatives in Rwanda. Nearly 55 per cent said they used the RHC website, but 30 per cent of respondents said that they did so via social media, a proportion of which rose to 63 per cent for the 18–30 years of age cohort, in particular Facebook, WhatsApp and Viber. A significant minority (12%) also reported that they learned via word of mouth.



In terms of awareness of the Government of Rwanda's policies and initiatives, most interview respondents claimed to be aware of these, in particular, Vision 2020 and the designation of Rwandans abroad as the "sixth region" of the country. However, several respondents were quite critical of this designation, expressing the view that if it was to be more than just a piece of political rhetoric, the Government of Rwanda should clarify what the sixth region means in practical terms and what support and services it can offer to Rwandans abroad to support a real partnership between the two.

Similarly, most interview and FGD respondents were aware that the Government of Rwanda was seeking to engage Rwandans in the diaspora for national development, and that there was a diaspora policy for the country, but lacked much detailed knowledge about what initiatives actually existed. This suggests that the Government of Rwanda should consider more targeted information campaigns clarifying what support and initiatives are in place and how Rwandans in the United Kingdom can take advantage of these.

FGD and interview respondents were aware of, and in many cases have participated in, summer camps organized by the Government of Rwanda (*Iteroro*) either in Rwanda or in Europe. Indeed, mothers who participated in FGDs and interviews also cited taking children back to Rwanda to see family, and to participate in government-supported summer camps, to help build their sense of connection with the country. Most, but not all, participants had also heard of the Government of Rwanda's diaspora initiatives listed in [Annex 5](#), although none had participated in these in recent years.

Over 80 per cent of FGD and interview respondents had attended some community events organized by the RHC in London in different locations and used its website and that of MINAFFET for information on the Government of Rwanda's policies and initiatives. RHC also maintains an active social media feed, as does the RPF youth group in the United Kingdom that is known to all respondents in the 18–30 years of age category.

Respondents were asked if they ever conducted any additional activities related to Rwanda, either while they were in Rwanda or in the United Kingdom. Of the survey respondents, 20 per cent said they undertook political activities or activism while they were in Rwanda, but this could include participation in any Government of Rwanda-run activity or meeting. In terms of their United Kingdom activities, only 10 per cent cited an additional activity, which was to raise awareness of the genocide in the United Kingdom, for example, in schools.

Respondents were also asked what additional initiatives, if any, Rwandans in the United Kingdom would like to see implemented by the Government of Rwanda or the RHC that would facilitate greater engagement in Rwanda's development. By far the most common response was "better information" (31%). A smaller percentage (16%) cited the need for support for Kinyarwanda teaching for Rwandan youth in the United Kingdom.



Finally, respondents were asked if they would like to see any special schemes targeting Rwandans in the United Kingdom. This was a multiple-choice question, a limitation of which is they can be leading, but 84 per cent reported they would like to see investment incentives, 70 per cent said they would like to see tax concessions, 38 per cent cited faster or less bureaucracy, and 10 per cent suggested volunteering schemes for young people. Interestingly, while 24 per cent also said they would like to see more scope for political involvement, only 8 per cent expressed interest in having Members of Parliament or assembly members representing Rwandans abroad.

## 5.7. RWANDAN WOMEN IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Efforts were made by the research team to recruit roughly equal numbers of female and male respondents to FGDs and interviews, which ultimately paid off. One FGD was organized specifically with Rwandan women to gain their perspectives. Participants in this FGD were predominantly a combination of female professionals and working mothers and housewives; this was an older cohort, predominantly in the 31–45 category.

Women who participated in FGDs and interviews noted that life for them in the United Kingdom can be hard, not least because they are expected to work and be “homemakers”, taking responsibility for childcare, cooking and chores. They contrasted this with their lives in Rwanda, where due to the availability and low cost of unskilled labour, many people can afford to employ domestic servants to carry out the chores. Some also alluded to the attitudes and expectations of their menfolk, who expected to be treated like “African men” when at home even if they were very modern, well-integrated professionals outside the home.

At the same time, they noted that their husbands and other male family members played quite an active role in parenting and sharing childcare, especially during school holidays. This was borne out by (male) respondents in other FGDs and interviews through references to “having to look after the children” or “having to pick the kids up”.

Female respondents with children reported feeling a special responsibility for transmitting or instilling Rwandan culture, values and identity to their children. They were very aware that their children were growing up in a very different cultural context, and while they were generally very positive about their prospects and opportunities in the United Kingdom, they also expressed fears about them losing their Rwandan identity. As noted above, one way in which this was articulated was language, and many female respondents (and some male ones) argued there was a need for Kinyarwanda classes for Rwandan young people in the United Kingdom, either delivered via the RHC or through Rwandan community organizations. This reflects the challenges in transmitting language and promoting language learning, especially literacy, of minority languages in a home setting, and underscores the strong connections between language, identity and culture.



Female professionals who participated in FGDs and interviews reported experiencing no barriers to their career or professional advancement as women. Several made the point that Rwanda is better at encouraging women into certain professions than is the case in the United Kingdom – in particular politics, where many Rwandan Members of Parliament and ministers are women. Indeed, the current High Commissioner to the United Kingdom was cited as an example of this by three female respondents.

## 5.8. BEING RWANDAN IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Of the FGD and interview respondents, everyone identified as being Rwandan, regardless of what other nationality they may hold. About half were Rwandan citizens, while just under half were British citizens, held dual nationality or citizens of another European Union country. All respondents were proud of their Rwandan identity, regardless of any other affiliations they might hold.

A concept in Kinyarwanda that was raised by some respondents in this regard was *Umuganda* (“communal work”, also “mutual self-help” or “coming together to achieve a shared outcome”).

Many younger respondents also pointed to having more than one or multiple identities – Rwandan, and also British or broader European (in some cases, this also reflected other European nationalities such as Belgian).

Age further appeared to be a determinant of identity. Respondents in the 18–30 age cohort were equally likely to describe themselves as “Rwandan” or “British” (especially those born in the United Kingdom), while older cohorts were more likely to define themselves as Rwandan, and to feel stronger links to Rwanda. At the same time, in interviews and FGDs, several respondents in this 18–30 group noted that their sense of British identity has been called into question as a result of sociopolitical trends in the United Kingdom, especially in relation to racism and xenophobia following the 2016 Brexit referendum. As one respondent put it, “I would have said I was British pretty much automatically up until about two years ago. Something here changed; people who never before questioned my place here have started to do so.”

A related concern from this age cohort was how they were perceived in Rwanda itself (that is, as [rich] foreigners rather than locals or even expats). Several interviewees described their sense of “difference” both in terms of how Rwandans at home perceived them, and also how differently they felt and thought about particular issues (one example given was that of sexuality and sexual orientation).

“

*In Britain, I feel more British, and in Rwanda, I feel more Rwandan – even though when I am in Rwanda, everyone can tell I'm from outside. I wish I spoke better Kinyarwanda!*

”

Male student, 18–30 years old





Conversely, older interview and FGD respondents with children, and especially women, expressed concerns about maintaining their children and grandchildren's sense of Rwandan identity and their connection to Rwanda. For most of the respondents, giving their children the opportunity to learn Kinyarwanda was extremely important (inter alia [section 5.1](#)), and there was a palpable sense from these that their children (and especially grandchildren) were losing their Rwandan identity. Equally, however, there were others in this cohort who spoke with a degree of amusement as well as pride that their children or grandchildren were growing up as young Britons.

Navigating and mediating these differences of culture, and also generation, was a challenge expressed by nearly half of the interview and FGD respondents.

Perceptions of Rwandan identity and history were felt keenly by some respondents, both as a source of pride and also for some younger respondents as a source of conflicted emotions. Knowledge of Rwanda among most British people is extremely limited, and tends to fall into limited tropes of poverty (cf. recent media debates in the United Kingdom around the deal the Government of Rwanda brokered with Arsenal football club to promote tourism to the country) or of genocide.<sup>24</sup> Many male and female respondents reported feeling under pressure or a burden to provide for their families in Rwanda, as well as to demonstrate their success in the United Kingdom.

This was experienced both as an expectation to provide financial or other resources to family members (on an ongoing and also emergency basis) and as linked to their status as foreign émigrés. Whenever they returned home to visit family, there was a clear expectation that they should bring money, gifts and also useful household items (ranging from cars to IT equipment). Several respondents noted that “people back home expect the streets here to be paved with gold, and therefore did not understand how hard life in the United Kingdom can be for the Rwandan community, particularly those working several jobs to maintain families. This was tempered, however, by a strong awareness of how hard life is in Rwanda for many (if not most) people, and how there are greater opportunities here if you “work hard and grab them”.

Finally, some respondents also cited the role played by Rwandans in the United Kingdom as cultural ambassadors between the two countries. A few reported that among their activities in this regard were raising awareness of the genocide in United Kingdom schools, as well as of Rwandan culture and food at community events. This is an area that the Government of Rwanda may wish to develop further to help promote investment and tourism to the country.

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<sup>24</sup> See, for examples, Waterson, 2018 and Allen, 2018.





## 6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As can be seen from the findings presented, the Rwandan community in the United Kingdom, while relatively small, is well-established in the country and contributes to Rwanda and the United Kingdom in varied ways. It is a diverse, heterogeneous community, with a strong work ethic and commitment to self-help and self-advancement. It is also relatively well-integrated in the United Kingdom.

The majority of respondents were career professionals, with some students also represented, working across a range of roles in the private and public sectors.

While the numbers of professionals working in five TVET sectors that had been identified by the Government of Rwanda as of particular interest (construction, ICT, renewable energy, mining and hospitality) were low in absolute terms, the only professional sector where no professionals were identified at all was mining.

Some respondents in KIIs and FGDs suggested that Rwandan students, recent graduates and young professionals could be encouraged to undertake specialized training in sectors of high demand or strategic interest to the Government of Rwanda, delivered in partnership with higher education and vocational institutions in the United Kingdom and Rwanda.

Of the five TVET sectors, 10 per cent of respondents were working in ICT, 6 per cent in hospitality and tourism and 2 per cent for construction and renewable energy. In addition, significant numbers of respondents were working in education, health and social care and management roles. KII and FGD participants, as well as attendees at the sensitization meetings, suggested that health (and social care) professionals would be interested in working or volunteering their skills in Rwanda, and that health should also be a TVET category of interest to Rwanda, a point that was also raised in the sensitization meetings.

As noted, the respondent cohort was a well-educated one, with nearly half (46%) of the respondents educated to degree level, and nearly 30 per cent possessing a postgraduate qualification or research degree (compared to around 35 per cent in the broader United Kingdom population who are educated to undergraduate level).<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> ONS, 2011.



Interestingly at the community sensitization meetings, some participants expressed surprise that this was the case, and queried to what extent this result was affected by survey limitations. However, the consistency in educational levels with other African diaspora communities in the United Kingdom strongly suggests this is representative of the Rwandan community in the United Kingdom, which in turn raises questions of how the community perceive themselves in relation to others.

The data collected show Rwandans in the United Kingdom contribute to Rwanda by deploying different forms of diaspora capital: financial, intellectual, sociopolitical and voluntarism. Rwandans in the United Kingdom remit significant amounts of money each month, with an average among respondents of between GBP 100 and GBP 200 per month, although this amount is significantly lower among the younger cohort. Increasingly, they remit money using online platforms rather than traditional MTOs, although significant proportions either used direct bank-to-bank transfers (18%) or prefer to send money via informal channels (18%).

One data source suggests that remittances from the United Kingdom to Rwanda are as high as GBP 8.2 million per year, remitted by over 4,000 Rwandans, which would make the United Kingdom the sixth highest source of remittances to Rwanda. However, there is an interesting lacuna in the available data on formal remittance flows to Rwanda from the United Kingdom, and so some caution is needed with these figures. Indeed, more data are needed on remittance flows from the United Kingdom to Rwanda, and also how and under what circumstances they do so, this is another area for further study.

Rwandans in the United Kingdom deploy significant financial, intellectual, social and political capital to contribute to Rwanda's development. Moreover, Rwanda arguably possesses powerful potential for enhancing diaspora engagement, inasmuch as values inherent within Rwandan culture – such as self-help and mutual support – have great potential to be harnessed. A recurrent theme in KIs and FGDs was the desire to contribute, but on their own terms and with flexibility.

A majority of respondents reported that they were interested to work or volunteer in Rwanda, in a way that builds on their existing patterns of engagement, both in terms of business and investment, and also their return to Rwanda, which tends to be circular and of relatively short duration.

Rwandan professionals with skills in a range of sectors expressed their interest in taking part in skills transfer and volunteering initiatives in Rwanda, especially if these were flexible enough to be tied to their visits to the country on a short- and medium-term basis.



These data clearly indicate that structured pathways for intervention that target Rwandans in the United Kingdom are likely to be more effective if they enable short-term volunteering opportunities, as well as longer-term placements.

Clearer and more flexible pathways for investment and enterprise opportunities are also needed, as well as skills transfer, a point raised across several KIIs and FGDs. Several KII and FGD respondents expressed interest in investing in Rwanda, but noted they had limited capital to invest and limited knowledge of how best to do so. Risk to investments was raised by some participants, but the biggest barriers seemed to be access to investment capital or investment opportunities suitable for smaller scale investors and lack of reliable market information.

From younger respondents, there was significant interest in volunteering and career development opportunities in Rwanda, something that also came up in the sensitization meetings. A point made by several respondents in KIIs and FGDs, especially those with families in the United Kingdom to support (over one third of respondents), was that it was difficult to sustain longer-term placements or assignments on a voluntary basis in Rwanda due to family and financial commitments in the United Kingdom.

Perhaps the biggest barrier to enhancing contributions from Rwandans in the United Kingdom to Rwanda, and in particular investments and voluntarism, is information flow. There is a lack of accurate, appealing, targeted and timely information pathways about community needs, investment, employment and volunteering opportunities in the country, and how best to align these flexibly with the needs and capabilities of individual Rwandans in the United Kingdom.

The relatively high level of awareness of government policies and initiatives targeting Rwandans abroad. However, some respondents suggested that engagement initiatives and programmes should be less centralised, more aligned to local needs at the community level, and more flexible.

The following recommendations are suggested to improve how Rwanda works with its diaspora in the United Kingdom, and to enhance the contributions of Rwandans in the United Kingdom to Rwanda.

**(a) Improving information flow to harness human capital of Rwandan communities abroad in the United Kingdom**

- (i) The Government of Rwanda – working with the private sector – should extend communications efforts, with targeted campaigns for recruitment of Rwandan professionals in priority TVET sectors and improve the promotion and marketing of investment opportunities for Rwandans in the United Kingdom. Respondents suggested this could take the form of



the Government of Rwanda and independent online platforms, websites and apps enabling sharing of opportunities and job/skills matching.

- (ii) Develop diaspora engagement schemes to harness the social, financial and intellectual capital of Rwandans abroad; this should be used to target different groups of returnees, notably those who have never worked in Rwanda and those who have worked there before. Promotional campaigns should target these two groups of Rwandans abroad in a segmented way, adapting different messages accordingly.
- (iii) The Government of Rwanda – working with the private and higher education sectors in Rwanda in the United Kingdom – should identify priority skills for matching with Rwandan students and professionals in the United Kingdom to offer placements and career development opportunities that are aligned with labour needs for skilled professionals in Rwanda in the coming years. This may be required to develop specialist skill sets that are in high demand or of strategic value to Government of Rwanda, such as construction or mineral engineering.

#### **(b) Harnessing voluntarism among the Rwandan community abroad in the United Kingdom**

- (i) The Government of Rwanda, the private sector and the voluntary/non-profit sector should develop online skills-sharing platforms to enable diaspora professionals to match local community needs in Rwanda with their skills, experience and availability. Most respondents reported that they wanted to contribute their skills and time to local community initiatives but wanted more information about what needs are, where and how they can contribute. This could also be used to implement remunerated skills-sharing pathways, in addition to facilitating more traditional forms of voluntarism.
- (ii) The Government of Rwanda should replicate and extend existing models of good practice, especially in regard to voluntary action, such as *Kwigira* (self-reliance projects) or *Ingobyi* community ambulances, by linking these to ongoing resource mobilization efforts, enabling them to contribute both money and volunteering their skills and time in support of specific needs or projects at the community level. Respondents noted that this could be facilitated by online platforms, both government-run and at the community level (please see [Annex 4](#) for more information on these schemes).
- (iii) Establish structured volunteering pathways to enable diaspora volunteering on a short- and long-term basis, especially for young Rwandan professionals, such as a National Diaspora Volunteering Service. There was significant interest from younger respondents in volunteering and career development opportunities in Rwanda.



### **(c) Mobilizing investments and remittances**

- (i) The Government of Rwanda should work with the private sector to develop a range of investment products, such as mortgages and diaspora bonds, targeting diaspora investors, with multiple entry levels and risk profiles.
- (ii) The Government of Rwanda and the private sector should develop segmented marketing campaigns targeting potential, new and experienced Rwandan investors based in the United Kingdom, such as small investors or retirees, to invest in priority sectors.
- (iii) The Government of Rwanda and the private sector should develop accurate and independent online resources on investing in different sectors in Rwanda, as well as how to invest in the country. These could be marketed at different subgroups among Rwandans in the United Kingdom, such as retirees, young professionals in the United Kingdom and even small-scale investors.
- (iv) The Government of Rwanda and the private sector should implement further initiatives to reduce remittance transfer costs through encouraging greater diversity of, formal remittances pathways (with appropriate levels of regulation) and extending opportunities for bank-to-bank direct transfers via different banks. While remittance transfer costs have been falling over the last five years, remittance providers have tended to offset this with increased currency exchange rates. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, agreed by UN Member States in Marrakech in 2018, includes commitments to reduce remittance transfer fees to 3 per cent or less.
- (v) Some respondents suggested there was a need for incentives such as tax relief or access to credit for Rwandans abroad to invest more in the country. The Government of Rwanda could therefore consider developing and implementing such schemes to aid engagement of Rwandans abroad.
- (vi) Working with United Kingdom and Rwandan Chambers of Commerce and business development services, encourage companies looking to invest or extend their operations in Rwanda to work with diaspora entrepreneurs, as well as encourage recruitment of Rwandans in the United Kingdom with specialized skill sets to priority sectors in high demand in Rwanda.



**(d) Connecting the Rwandan community abroad in the United Kingdom to Rwanda**

The Government of Rwanda, working with relevant government and third-sector agencies and groups in the United Kingdom, should also consider the following:

- (i) Strengthening the capacity of Rwandan community organizations in the United Kingdom to enhance their engagement with Rwanda through signposting to funding, training and organizational development opportunities.
- (ii) Establishing Rwandan professionals, students and alumni networks to connect Rwandan professionals in different sectors with each other, and employment opportunities.
- (iii) Extending community outreach activities and virtual services offered to Rwandans in the United Kingdom by RHC. Due to the geographical distribution of Rwandans in the United Kingdom, at least half of the community members are based outside of London, and so are less able to access services and attend events.
- (iv) The RHC in the United Kingdom is already active in organizing community events outside the London area, but these could be further extended. Similarly, improved virtual/online services can be an effective way of engaging community members and providing information about the many ways in which they can contribute to local community initiatives in Rwanda.
- (v) Supporting Kinyarwanda language teaching to young Rwandans in the United Kingdom through the use of online language resources, delivered in partnership with RHC and Rwandan community organizations in different United Kingdom locations. This would help promote Rwandan identity among second and subsequent generations of Rwandans abroad, as well as encourage their engagement with Rwanda. RHC could further support this by organizing language courses both on a semester basis and via summer camps and youth groups.





## ANNEX 1 – SURVEY TOOLS

### Survey tools

While the desk review phase formed an initial phase of the study, the survey tools (questionnaires, focus groups and interviews) were developed and deployed simultaneously, taking advantage of upcoming community events wherever possible, in order to maximize participant response rates and allow as much time as possible for data collection.

One challenge to be highlighted in this context is the divided nature of the Rwandan community in the United Kingdom. In part due to differing migration patterns and histories, Rwandans in the United Kingdom are invariably heterogenous and diverse in outlook, but may broadly be characterized as being pro-Government of Rwanda, anti-Government of Rwanda or indifferent/ambivalent. There are degrees of distrust between these three groups, and there was an attendant risk of the study being perceived as biased in favour of the Government of Rwanda, which arguably affected respondent response patterns. Equally, the Rwandan High Commission (RHC) expressed a clear interest in mapping those Rwandans abroad who do not normally engage with its activities in the United Kingdom. Efforts were therefore made to include those respondents who are not pro-Government of Rwanda through mediated dissemination of questionnaires, as well as focus groups and interviews with Rwandans from all three groups. All research tools were piloted before use, firstly on an informal and internal peer review basis, and subsequently with a small number of community members.

### Questionnaires

The African Foundation for Development (AFFORD), in coordination with consultants in the other three countries, developed self-administered questionnaires to be deployed online and in paper form. Online versions were made available via the AFFORD website, as well as that of RHC in the United Kingdom. Online questionnaires were further disseminated via social media channels and other diaspora networks.

Following discussions with the other country consultants regarding sample sizes, it was initially agreed that AFFORD would gather at least 100 completed questionnaires, with an internal (stretch) target of 150 completed questionnaires.

Following feedback from the two community sensitization meetings in January 2019 and discussions with IOM Rwanda, IOM United Kingdom and RHC, a second data collection phase was undertaken in February to March 2019, with a target of collecting an additional 50 surveys and an additional 5 key informant interviews.



## **Interviews**

AFFORD undertook 15 one-to-one semi-structured interviews, either in person or by phone in the initial data collection phase. A further 7 interviews were conducted in person or by phone in the second data collection phase in February to March 2019, making a total of 22 interviews.

Interview respondents included members of United Kingdom-based Rwandan diaspora communities in different nations and regions of the United Kingdom, including London and the South-East, the Midlands' and the north of England, as well Scotland and Wales. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, it has not been possible to schedule interviews with officials at RHC and at MINAFFET in Kigali.

## **Focus group discussions**

For a more informative discussion of key topics, 4 focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted in the United Kingdom to probe deeper into the subject of study, with a total of 31 participants. These were held in different locations in the United Kingdom, and following feedback from participants who were concerned that their comments could be in some way attributable, these are described as “north of England”, “Midlands”, “South-East of England” and “South Coast”. Of the four focus groups, one focused mostly on Rwandan women in the United Kingdom, while one was comprised mostly of Rwandan young professionals and students. Participants of one FGD could be characterized as being ambivalent or anti-Government of Rwanda, although respondents were not recruited deliberately as such and the topics under discussion were not directly political.

To facilitate these FGDs, interview guides and schedules were designed in a way that allows for a more explorative research, and attempts were made to co-schedule where possible with existing community events, although this did not prove successful.



## ANNEX 2 – INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

### Semi-structured interviews: July–August 2018; February–March 2019

Gender	Age	Sector of employment/ occupation	Based in
F	18–30	IT entrepreneur	North of England
M	31–45	Public sector manager	North of England
F	31–45	Health and social care	Scotland
M	31–45	Lecturer	South-East of England
M	18–30	Postgraduate student	Wales
F	18–30	Finance/Business management	South-East of England
F	18–30	Entrepreneur	South-East of England
M	31–45	Private sector management	South-East of England
M	31–45	Communications and media	Midlands
M	31–45	Community leader	South-East of England
F	18–30	Education (Primary)	South Coast
F	18–30	Postgraduate student	Midlands
F	31–45	Hospitality	Midlands
M	18–30	Education (Secondary)	South Coast
M	31–45	Finance/Business management	South Coast
F	46–60	Nurse	Midlands
M	46–60	Compliance manager	Midlands
F	18–30	Retail manager	Midlands
F	31–45	Entrepreneur	South Coast
F	18–30	Recent graduate/Retail worker	London
M	46–60	Development manager	South-East of England
M	31–45	Social worker	North of England



## ANNEX 3 – FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS SCHEDULE

### Focus group discussion 1 – North of England, July 2018

Gender	Age	Sector of employment/occupation	Based in
M	45–60	Finance	North of England
M	31–45	Communications and media	North of England
M	45–60	Customer service manager	North of England
M	45–60	Higher education	North of England
M	31–45	Railway worker	North of England

### Focus group discussion 2 – Midlands, August 2018

Gender	Age	Sector of employment/occupation	Based in
F	31–45	Education (Primary)	Midlands
F	31–45	Hospitality	Midlands
F	31–45	Hospitality	Midlands
F	31–45	Housewife	Midlands
F	31–45	Housewife	Midlands
F	31–45	Carer	Midlands
F	31–45	Carer	Midlands
F	31–45	Unemployed	Midlands
M	31–45	Youth work	Midlands

### Focus group discussion 3 – South-East, August 2018

Gender	Age	Sector of employment/occupation	Based in
M	31–45	Finance/Business	South-East
M	18–30	Public sector management	South-East
F	18–30	Student (Postgraduate)	South-East
F	31–45	Finance/Business	South-East
M	31–45	Retail management	South-East
M	18–30	Student (Postgraduate)/Retail	South-East
M	18–30	Project management	South-East

**Focus group discussion 4 – South of England, August 2018**

<b>Gender</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Sector of employment/occupation</b>	<b>Based in</b>
M	18–30	Student (Postgraduate)	South Coast
M	18–30	Student (Undergraduate)	South Coast
F	18–30	Student (Postgraduate)	South Coast
M	18–30	Student (Undergraduate)	South Coast
F	18–30	Student (Postgraduate)	South Coast
F	18–30	Health and social care	South Coast
M	18–30	Housing management	South Coast
F	18–30	Public sector management	South Coast
M	18–30	Student (Undergraduate)	South Coast
F	18–30	Student (Undergraduate)	South Coast



## ANNEX 4 – FEEDBACK AND QUESTIONS RAISED BY COMMUNITY MEMBERS AT IOM/RWANDAN HIGH COMMISSION COMMUNITY SENSITIZATION MEETINGS

### Feedback and questions from the Rwandan workshop in London, 10 January 2019

- (a) Is it too late to take part in the survey?
- (b) How come the health sector is not part of the five chosen sectors (TVET)?
- (c) Is it surprising that 39 per cent of respondents remit money, but the cost of remittances only consists 3 per cent of the GDP? Is it possible that some of these remittances are diverted into informal channels?
- (d) Comment: Social networks can be scary for countries back in Africa; they can spread bad or good news. There are a lot of restrictions when it comes to information and sharing information in general.
- (e) Regarding remittances, there is an issue regarding the formal versus informal ways of transferring money. This needs to be reflected in the report.
- (f) Need to engage more people into the research. Maybe it is worth considering telephone interviews?
- (g) What is the reality on the ground in terms of engagements from the research?
- (h) Why is the second event in Coventry when there are more in Birmingham?
- (i) With the skills transfers, most of the skills that we have are not directly transferred into the TVET, meaning what the country needs in terms of skills gaps versus the diaspora's skills.
- (j) There are a lot of students who want to give something back to Rwanda but don't know the right people to start any initiative.  
 "Is there anyone who can help us? It is important to have structured ways for enabling such transfers."  
 "Regarding investment back in Rwanda, we might have the urge but not the network or how best to do it."  
 "We need to improve the flow of information."
- (k) Need to clarify the finding on management.

**Feedback and questions from the Rwandan workshop in Coventry, 11 January 2019**

- (a) The study mentions that 50 per cent of Rwandans are educated to a degree level. This seems very high. Why was this so high? Couldn't this be an overrepresentation in the research sample?
- (b) I have a question related to the validity of the report. If you are saying that the size of the Rwandan population is between 10,000 to 15,000, then based on the number of respondents in the study, these represent about 1 per cent of the population, which is certainly not representative.
- (c) More questions were asked about how representative the sample of the research was and whether some of the findings were over-representative because you ended up speaking to people of a similar background and others?
- (d) How far can the potential of the diaspora go beyond remittances? Maybe the study should focus more on other types of contributions the diaspora can make?
- (e) The research states that 64 per cent of the remittances are spent on health. This is surprising, as the health system in Rwanda is quite good. So what could be the explanation for such a high percentage?
- (f) In terms of the flow of information, you always tell us that we are the sixth province. How come there is not as many organizations targeting this sixth province?
- (g) How do you plan to disseminate the findings from this research?
- (h) Is there any programme targeting the youth to encourage them to contribute to the development of Rwanda?



## ANNEX 5 – GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA DIASPORA PROGRAMMES

The Government of Rwanda diaspora policy also sets out a number of diaspora programmes that the Government should implement in order to achieve these objectives:

### *Programme 1: Mobilization, communication and image-building*

Activities under this programme include a dedicated website and a diaspora database. The latter of these is still not operational. While there is arguably a business case for establishing databases of Rwandan skills, expertise and also investments, data privacy and data ownership concerns need to be considered carefully. The Diaspora General Directorate (DGD) website is currently being updated and its functionality is rather limited at present (for example, it is not possible to download documents such as the Diaspora Guide that was previously published).

### *Programme 2: Advocacy and protection of Rwandan diaspora interests*

Activities under this programme include improving consular services for Rwandans abroad and monitoring the reintegration of Rwandan diaspora returning permanently to the country.

### *Programme 3: Promotion and facilitation of diaspora investment and remittances in Rwanda*

Many of the concrete initiatives vis-à-vis Rwandans abroad have been concerned with attracting investment in the private sector. Concrete initiatives include a mutual fund, Agaciro, as well as a number of initiatives to ease banking and other initiatives to ease investment, such as the Capital Market Advisory Council and Rwanda Development Board.

### *Programme 4: Capacity-building, skills and knowledge transfers*

The Government of Rwanda has identified priority skills areas to meet skills gaps in the labour force in specific sectors. The policy references the Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals and Migration for Development in Africa skills transfer initiatives led by the World Bank and IOM respectively. Responsibility for these programmes in Rwanda has passed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation as of 2016.





***Programme 5: Promotion of community links between diaspora and local organizations (Women, sports people, professionals, businesspeople)***

Activities under this programme include organizing meetings and conferences targeting diaspora professionals in various sectors, both in Rwanda and elsewhere, and establishing professional networks (this last item is yet to happen).

***Programme 6: Mobilization of Rwandan youth in the diaspora***

The Government of Rwanda has been active in seeking to engage young Rwandans abroad. In addition to annual summer camps held both in Rwanda and in the diaspora, it organizes an annual youth forum for young Rwandans, including those in the diaspora.

***Programme 7: Institutional support to Diaspora General Directorate***

This last programme area relates to strengthening DGD's organizational, technical and staff capacities.

A review of these programmes falls outside the scope of this study, but it is clear that while the Government of Rwanda has implemented many of these over recent years, awareness and uptake of such initiatives by Rwandans abroad has been varied.



## ANNEX 6 – RWANDA’S HOME-GROWN INITIATIVES AND SOLUTIONS<sup>26</sup>

### **Umuganda (Community work)**

Modern-day *Umuganda* can be described as community work. On the last Saturday of each month, communities come together to do a variety of public works. This often includes infrastructure development and environmental protection. Rwandans aged between 18 and 65 are obliged to participate in *Umuganda*. *Umuganda* is a tradition that has been revitalized as a tool for the socioeconomic development of the country, driven by the communities themselves. *Umuganda* is enabling local communities to build basic infrastructure, such as roads maintenance, schools, health facilities and administrative offices. It is also a forum for conviviality and social cohesion, and enables communication between the population in their neighbourhood, as well as with the leaders. By law, every village holds *Umuganda* every last Saturday of the month and a village meeting after each community work session.

### **Imihigo (Performance contracts)**

*Imihigo* is as old as pre-colonial Rwanda. *Imihigo* is a cultural practice in the ancient tradition of Rwanda where an individual would set himself/herself targets to be achieved within a specific period of time by following principles and having determination to overcome the possible challenges. In modern Rwanda, the *Imihigo* practice was adapted as a means of planning to accelerate progress towards economic development and poverty reduction. *Imihigo* has a strong focus on results, which makes it an invaluable tool in planning, accountability and monitoring.

### **Ubudehe (Pro-poor community help scheme)**

*Ubudehe* is a traditional Rwandan practice of mutual help or mutual assistance among people in order to solve their problems. This approach was mainly used by farmers for cultivating the land in preparation for the agricultural season. On this occasion, a group of households come together to dig their fields, acting collectively to share the burden of the work and make sure that everyone is ready on time for the planting season. The practice of *Ubudehe* encouraged the population to get together around a common goal, and facilitated participatory problem-solving, social cohesion and evaluation processes. It is on this traditional practice that the Government of Rwanda has built today's *Ubudehe* programme. The name *Ubudehe* was specifically chosen as a reminder that collective action and participatory development are rooted in the Rwandan society.

<sup>26</sup> Reproduced from United Nations Development Programme and Government of Rwanda, 2015:195–196.



### **Abunzi (Mediation committees)**

The word *Abunzi* can be translated as “those who reconcile”. In traditional Rwanda, *Abunzi* were men known within their communities for personal integrity and were asked to intervene in the event of conflict. Each party would choose a person considered trustworthy, known as a problem-solver and who was unlikely to alienate either party. The purpose of this system was to settle disputes, reconcile the parties and restore harmony within the affected community. *Abunzi* can be seen as a Rwandan hybrid form of justice, combining traditional with modern methods of conflict resolution. The reintroduction of the *Abunzi* system in 2004 was motivated by the desire to reduce the backlog of court cases, as well as decentralize justice and make it more affordable and accessible for citizens seeking to resolve conflict. Today, *Abunzi* is fully integrated into Rwanda’s justice system.

### **Girinka (One cow per poor family) programme**

*Girinka* is one of the innovations adopted in the implementation of the Vision 2020, the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy and the Integrated Development Programme. The programme is based on the premise that providing a dairy cow to poor households helps to improve their livelihood as a result of a more nutritious and balanced diet from milk, increased agricultural output through better soil fertility, as well as greater incomes by commercializing dairy products. In Rwandan history, cattle have always represented as an economic reserve, an economic guarantee and a sign of social ease. Social status was often recognized through the possession of cattle. The concept of *Girinka* was first introduced by King Mibambwe Gisanura (1660 AD), who issued a decree that “no Rwandan child was ever to lack daily milk again while others had plenty”. Since then, Rwandans have given cattle to one another or milk to those in need (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2011a:104).

### **Gacaca**

The *Gacaca* court is a system of grass-roots courts inspired by traditional power. Originally, the *Gacaca* settled village or familial disputes. The courts were informal means of solving disputes around issues like theft, marital issues, land rights and property damage. They were constituted as village assemblies and presided over by the elders, where each member of the community could request to speak. The trials were meant to promote reconciliation and justice of the perpetrator in front of family and neighbours. Well-respected elders, known as *Inyangamugayo*, were elected based on their honesty by the people of the community. They would assemble all parties to a crime and arbitrate a resolution involving reparations or some act of contrition. In relation to the Rwandan genocide, the *Gacaca* process provided a basis for settlement; the system emphasized the importance of accord, condemning the guilty and promoting collaboration between those judges and observers.





### ***Umushyikirano***

*Umushyikirano* is a traditional term for a meeting where participants meet to exchange ideas, share experiences and question each other. The National Dialogue platform (as it is now called) is chaired by the president of the Republic, and brings together representative leaders from the central and local government, private sector and civil society at all levels, as well as development stakeholders to discuss development issues. This forum is established within the framework of Article 168 of the Rwandan constitution of 2003. *Umushyikirano* is an annual event usually held at the end of the year to take stock of what the country has achieved, what is outstanding, the challenges faced and how Rwandans can collectively address them. It is a platform that gives Rwandans from all walks of life the opportunity to ask questions and suggest solutions to the nation's development challenges. *Umushyikirano* also serves as a forum for Rwandans to hold their leaders and government to account.



# ANNEX 7 – REMITTANCE FLOWS INTO AND OUT OF RWANDA, 2014



Source: Roxana Torre, Remittance flows. Original visualization available at <https://faisal khan.com/remittances/#>.



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